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The federal government has used criminal fines to punish 
corporations for as long as it has been convicting corporations. Yet to 
this day, with more than a century in which to get the punishment 
right, corporate-criminal fines fail to satisfy virtually any standard 
justification that underlies criminal punishment.
Attempts to address the failure of corporate-criminal fines founder on 
two shoals. First, there is a deep and abiding ambiguity about what it 
means to designate corporate fines as a failed punishment. Second, 
there is a tendency to see the failure of punishment as a problem for 
criminal law to solve and, in doing so, to treat corporate law as a 
fixed, immutable feature of the legal background. This particularly is 
a profound mistake: the failure of corporate-criminal fines is as much 
a corporate-law problem as it is a criminal-law problem.
Corporate punishment stands at the vanguard of the conceptual and 
regulatory interplay between corporate and criminal law. At the heart 
of this conflict is an interaction between drastically different 
regulatory functions that operate on the basis of conflicting 
conceptions of the corporation: corporations as persons for criminal 
law, and corporations as systems for corporate law. While pluralism 
about the nature of corporation works well when cabined to specific 
legal domains, corporate-criminal punishment forces these domains, 
and their competing conception of the corporation, to reconcile or 
give way.
This Article explores the intimate connections between corporate law 
and criminal punishment—specifically, how corporate law creates the 
conditions for, makes necessary, and yet at the same time undermines 
criminal law’s efforts to punish corporations. Appreciating these 
interconnections requires understanding not just the conceptual 
frames implicit to each area of law, but also the historical contingency
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of associating certain conceptions of the corporation with particular 
legal domains. To be sure, this Article is reform-minded: I consider 
what it would mean to improve criminal fines through corporate-law 
reforms designed to redistribute the harms attendant to criminal fines 
in a manner that better aligns the punishment with standard 
penological aims. That said, the ambition first and foremost is to 
reveal a blind spot in current discussions of corporate-criminal 
punishment by drawing attention to the conceptual intricacies that 
attend a practice—corporate-criminal punishment—that stitches 
together diametrically opposed conceptions of the corporation.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................603 
II. THE FAILURES OF CORPORATE-CRIMINAL FINES .........................608 
A. How to Evaluate Corporate Punishment ..............................608 
B. Corporate-Criminal Fines as a Failed Method of 
Punishment............................................................................609 
1. Fines as Deterrence ........................................................610 
2. Retributivism, Fines, and Corporations .........................612 
3. Fines as Promoting Respect for Law ..............................614 
C. How Not to Evaluate Corporate Punishment .......................617 
1. Corporate-Criminal Punishment and Impossible 
Standards ........................................................................618 
2. Intentional vs. Foreseeable Harm ..................................620 
3. Corporate vs. Individual Experiences of Harm ..............622 
III. THE INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF CORPORATE AND CRIMINAL 
LAW.............................................................................................624 
A. Competing Agendas and Conceptions of the 
Corporation ..........................................................................625 
B. Corporate Law Makes Corporate-Criminal Liability 
Possible .................................................................................628 
1. A Bit of Ground-Clearing Regarding Corporate 
Personhood .....................................................................628 
2. What It Takes for an Agent to Be a Person Under
the Law...........................................................................630
3. What It Takes for a Collective Agent to Be a 
Person Under the Law ....................................................631
4. Corporate Law Provides the Backbone for 
Corporate Personhood ...................................................634 
C. Corporate Law Makes Corporate-Criminal Liability 
Necessary ..............................................................................637 
2017] CORPORATE CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 603
1. Criminal Regulation as a Replacement for 
Corporate Law Regulation .............................................638
2. Incorporation Facilitates and Encourages 
Criminality ......................................................................638 
3. Individual Criminal Liability Is Insufficient ...................639 
D. Corporate Law Undermines Corporate-Criminal Fines ......641 
1. Imposing Punishment vs. Distributing Harm .................642 
2. Negotiable Punishments .................................................642 
3. The Role of Corporate Law in Undermining 
Criminal Fines ................................................................643 
IV. CAN AND SHOULD CORPORATE LAW IMPROVE CRIMINAL 
FINES?..........................................................................................645 
A. Can Corporate Law Reform Improve Criminal 
Punishment?..........................................................................645 
1. Director Liability for Corporate-Criminal Fines ...........645 
2. The Corporate-Crime Clawback Bylaw .........................647 
3. Anticipating Objections ..................................................650 
B. Corporate-Law Reform, or Just More Criminal 
Punishment?..........................................................................653 
C. Should Corporate Law Improve Criminal Punishment? ......656 
1. Corporate Reform Solves a Problem Created by 
Corporate Law ................................................................657 
2. Corporate-Law Reform Is Limited to Criminal 
Punishment......................................................................658 
3. Corporate Law Should Not Accept Its Complicity 
for the Status Quo ...........................................................658 
V. CONCLUSION................................................................................659 
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been over one hundred years since the Supreme Court first blessed 
the practice of holding a corporation criminally responsible separate from its 
individual stakeholders.1 Surveying the intervening century, at least one 
outcome seems abundantly clear: corporate criminal punishment has roundly 
failed. Criminal fines, the paradigmatic form of corporate punishment, not 
only fail to satisfy the standard goals of punishment,2 but upon reflection 
appear to be structurally incapable of doing so.3 Alternative corporate 
punishments adopted in the past few decades—corporate probation, forced 
dissolution, regulatory intervention, and suspension—are more promising in 
                                                                                                                     
1 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 481 (1909).
2 See infra Part II.B.
3 See infra Part II.C.
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theory; yet these too have proven unsuccessful, albeit likely due more to a lack 
of political will and judicial expertise than structural defect.
Failure has provoked an array of responses. Skeptics, arguing that this 
failure reaffirms a conceptual incoherence in the very idea of holding a 
corporation criminally responsible, propose “solving” the failure of corporate 
punishment by abandoning entirely the practice of holding corporations 
criminally liable.4 At the other end of the spectrum, supporters of corporate-
criminal liability have invented new punishments ostensibly better suited to 
punish corporations than the current panoply.5 Yet, despite their policy 
disagreements, both groups share an implicit assumption about the proper 
relationship between corporate law and criminal law—one that hamstrings 
their analyses and solutions. With few exceptions, skeptics and supporters 
alike take corporations and corporate law as a settled fact of the legal 
landscape, working to develop criminal-law solutions that improve criminal 
punishment within the fixed parameters of the corporate law. Too often 
scholarship on corporate-criminal liability and punishment relegates corporate 
law to a background, immutable feature that any analysis of the problem takes 
as a given.
It is a mistake to evaluate the failure of corporate-criminal punishment 
exclusively, or even primarily, through the lens of criminal law. Corporate 
punishment stands at the vanguard of the conceptual and regulatory interplay 
between corporate and criminal law. At a fundamental level, corporate and 
criminal law serve markedly different regulatory functions that stem from, and 
are informed by, diametrically opposed conceptions of what the corporation is. 
One legal domain treats the corporation as a single person that can be held 
responsible separately from its constitutive individuals.6 The other domain 
treats corporations as systems to be designed and tinkered with in the service 
of facilitating productive cooperation amongst various contingencies of 
                                                                                                                     
4 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Trial: Lessons 
from the Law of Unconstitutional Conditions, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM 38, 45 
(Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, 
Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 320–21 (1996). See generally Jeffrey S. Parker, 
Corporate Crime, Overcriminalization, and the Failure of American Public Morality, in 
THE AMERICAN ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON THE RULE OF LAW 407 (F.H. Buckley ed., 2013) 
(discussing the American legal system’s criminalization of corporations in comparison to 
other countries).
5 E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized 
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 387–88 (1981) 
(forcing equity distributions); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate 
Criminal Liability: Containing the Machine Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 
ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 975 (2005) (removing directors and officers); Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty 
by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility in the Face of Corporate Crime, 63 
HASTING L.J. 411, 449–50 (2012) (restricting corporate political speech); Peter A. French, 
The Hester Prynne Sanction, BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J., Winter 1985, at 19, 22–23 (corporate 
shaming).
6 See infra Part III.A.
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stakeholders.7 At the same time, these areas of law are deeply enmeshed when 
it comes to understanding how to think about and how to regulate corporations 
and corporate misconduct. Corporate-criminal punishment implicates intimate 
connections between corporate law and criminal punishment—how corporate 
law creates both the possibility of, but also the need for, corporate-criminal 
liability, and yet is responsible for undermining our attempts to criminally 
punish corporations.
This Article is the first in a series examining corporate law’s contribution 
to the systematic failure of efforts thus far to punish corporations. Whereas 
subsequent entries in the series will evaluate recently developed corporate 
punishments like corporate probation, forced dissolution, and regulatory 
suspension, this Article focuses entirely on corporate-criminal fines. The fine, 
after all, is the paradigmatic form of corporate punishment; it is the first, and 
for decades the only, method by which the criminal law could hold a 
corporation criminally responsible for its misconduct.8 Today, it continues to 
be the most prevalent method of punishing corporations: nearly 90% of 
organizations convicted between 1999 and 2012 received some form of 
financial sanction.9 Moreover, at least at first glance, there is much to 
recommend about corporate-criminal fines. Comparatively speaking, fines are 
easy to administer; easy to scale in response to the size of the corporation, the 
severity of the crime, and a host of other factors;10 easy to predict in their 
consequences to third parties (including their social benefits)11; and easy to see 
as fitting punishment—what better way to punish an entity designed largely to 
create wealth than to seize from it its wealth?
And yet, for all these purported benefits, corporate-criminal fines have 
failed as punishment. Moreover, this is a failure not (just) in execution, but in 
design; fines are structurally ill-suited to satisfy or exemplify any of the 
standard justifications offered on behalf of the state’s rationales and authority 
to punish.12 In this Article, I demonstrate both that this design flaw traces to
features of corporate law, and that the contingency of these corporate-law 
features goes frequently overlooked. Criminal punishment of corporations has 
failed, and that failure stems in large part from unchallenged background 
settings of corporate law that confound criminal punishment.
Unpacking the interconnections between criminal law and corporate law 
as they bear on corporate punishment requires appreciating how two domains 
                                                                                                                     
7 See infra Part III.A.
8 United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 127 (1958).
9 See generally Sourcebook Archives, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION,
http://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook/archive [https://perma.cc/L4Y3-LMYF] (data 
compiled by author using information provided).
10 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2015) (calculating a fine for organizations).
11 See Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 409, 415 (1980).
12 See discussion infra Part II.B.1–.2.
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of law work sometimes together and sometimes at cross purposes. 
Appreciating these interconnections requires unpacking the conceptual 
frameworks underlying each area of law. However, theorizing cannot occur in 
a vacuum; at least “[u]pon this point[,] a page of history is worth a volume of 
logic.”13 Just as crucial as identifying how corporate law and criminal law 
differ conceptually is recognizing the historical contingency of associating 
certain conceptions of the corporation with particular legal domains. 
Accordingly, this Article draws variously from philosophical, legal, and 
historical sources. And although this Article is reform-minded, the ambition 
first and foremost is to reveal a blind spot in current discussions of corporate-
criminal punishment by drawing attention to the conceptual intricacies that 
attend a practice—corporate-criminal punishment—that stitches together 
diametrically opposed conceptions of the corporation.
Deep, foundational questions aside, the proposal advanced here is simple: 
insofar as the state is committed to holding corporations criminally liable and 
punishing them, it should be committed to doing so well. Corporate-law 
reform offers a potentially promising avenue for improving the criminal 
punishments we already have. For these purposes, I sketch a proposal for a 
“Corporate-Crime Clawback” of incentive payments made to corporate 
stakeholders, which, combined with a reform that reverses the ordinary flow of 
financial harm through a corporation in the special case of criminal 
punishment, promises to meaningfully improve criminal fines as a form of 
corporate punishment.
To be sure, stakes are high in such a project: the way in which corporate 
law confounds criminal punishment implicates foundational, deeply held 
tenets of our corporate practice.14 Nevertheless, insofar as the state is 
committed to holding corporations criminally responsible and punishing them, 
there are convincing reasons to modulate, or at least circumscribe, some 
features of corporate law for the purpose of making effective corporate 
punishment. Not only is corporate law able to improve criminal punishment, 
but—given its role in undermining the same practice that it makes both 
possible but also necessary—there are good reasons to think that corporate law 
further has a responsibility to do so.
More prosaically, the Article proceeds as follows. Part II clarifies the 
standards according to which I base my assessment that a punishment 
succeeds or fails. Because I try to take our legal practice mostly as I find it, I 
focus here on the standard justifications given for punishment by judges and 
scholars alike. I then demonstrate that, for every standard justification offered 
in support of punishment, corporate-criminal fines fail to deliver on that 
justification. Finally, Part II disambiguates the failure of punishment qua
punishment from a separate complaint with corporate-criminal fines—namely, 
that fines cause innocent individuals to experience harm. I show that this 
                                                                                                                     
13 N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
14 See infra Part III.A.
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problem is not a problem unique to corporate punishment and that, moreover,
the tools for addressing this separate problem fall within the province of 
corporate law rather than criminal law.
Part III unpacks the underexplored connections between corporate law and 
criminal law. It first captures the key features by which the two doctrines 
differ both with respect to the regulatory purpose the bodies of law serve and 
the different conceptions of the corporation according to which they implicitly 
operate. Corporate law operates according to what I call the “Systems 
Conception of the Corporation”; corporations are systems to be engineered by 
a combination of law, market forces, and private initiative for the purpose of 
serving some (usually commercial) end sought jointly by the individuals who 
constitute the corporation.15 By contrast, criminal law presupposes what I refer 
to as the “Persons Conception of the Corporation”; it treats a corporation as a 
single person expected to conform its conduct to legal prohibitions.16 These 
opposing conceptions of the corporation intersect at the moment of criminal 
liability and punishment. To that end, I demonstrate that corporate law is 
instrumental in creating the possibility of, but also the need for, exposing 
corporations to the criminal law.
At the same time, corporate law bears complicity for the failure of 
criminal fines. The Persons Conception of the Corporation underwriting 
criminal law makes it the case that the distribution of harm attendant to a 
corporate-criminal fine—a type of punishment that fits into a special class of 
punishments that I call “Negotiable Punishments”17—is turned over to the 
private negotiations of stakeholders inside the corporation. However, corporate 
law effectively imposes the adoption of an internal structure that makes any 
sense of negotiation farcical and the resultant distribution of harm to the 
corporation’s shareholders a foregone conclusion. As it turns out, this 
distribution is central in diagnosing why criminal fines fail the various 
rationales of punishment discussed in Part II.
Crucially, Part IV demonstrates that the state is not committed to turning 
over the distribution of harm to the private negotiations of corporate 
stakeholders. Nor should it. There are good reasons for the state to affect the 
distribution of criminal fines, even while continuing to leave the distribution of 
all other liabilities to the private negotiations of corporate members. Part IV 
thus offers an illustration of what such a reform might look like; expanding on 
recent innovation by federal legislators, I sketch a Corporate-Crime Clawback
that shifts the harm of fines away from shareholders in a way that helps to 
secure standard penological benefits central to criminal law. Finally, I close by 
demonstrating how standard complaints against reforms of this character get 
their purchase only by equivocating between two characterizations—the same 
                                                                                                                     
15 See infra Part III.
16 See infra Part III.
17 See infra Part III.D.2.
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two characterizations that Part II takes pains to disambiguate—of what it 
means to call fines a failed punishment.
II. THE FAILURES OF CORPORATE-CRIMINAL FINES
A. How to Evaluate Corporate Punishment
This Article takes as established territory the fact that the state can and 
will hold a corporation, separate from its individual stakeholders, criminally 
responsible for misconduct.18 This authority has existed at the federal level 
since at least 1909, when in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. 
United States the Supreme Court recognized Congress’s authority to extend 
criminal statutes—even those statutes containing general-intent provisions—to 
corporations.19 Granted, it is a separate discussion whether the notion of 
corporate-criminal liability is morally and conceptually well-founded (it is) 
and whether the doctrine instantiating the practice accords with such a 
foundation (it does not).20 Regardless, this Article focuses attention 
exclusively on the consequences of the state’s decision to hold corporations 
responsible—specifically, on corporate punishment. It is my contention, one 
likely to garner widespread support across the spectrum of legal scholars, that
corporate punishment is and has been a failure.
How do we judge the success or failure of a punishment? A 
straightforward evaluation considers whether, and to what extent, the sanction 
vindicates or embodies a traditional justification for imposing punishment. 
While philosophers and legal theorists disagree over the virtues and vices (and 
contours) of different justifications, the federal government at least has settled 
on a pluralistic approach to punishment.21 According to federal law, 
punishment is intended to serve the following purposes, articulated most 
clearly in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a):
The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, 
to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The 
court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—
. . . .
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for 
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
                                                                                                                     
18 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 481 (1909).
19 Id.
20 See generally W. Robert Thomas, When and How Corporations Became Persons 
Under the Criminal Law, and Why It Matters Now (Aug. 28, 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author).
21 See infra Part III.A.
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(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner.22
In broad strokes, § 3553(a) encapsulates what legal scholars and 
philosophers take to be the standard set of justifications for punishment: 
deterrence (“to afford adequate deterrence”), including incapacitation (“to 
protect the public from further crimes”) and rehabilitation (“to provide the 
defendant with needed educational or vocational training”); retribution (“to 
provide just punishment for the offense”); and a reinforcement of social 
cohesion via the expression of communal condemnation (“to promote respect 
for the law”).23
Now is as good a time as any to flag a distinction that recurs throughout 
this Article. The claim I am advancing is that corporate-criminal fines fail as a 
form of punishment. By this, I mean that fines fail to satisfy the penological 
rationales above, which traditionally underwrite state punishment. However, 
there is a separate criticism frequently conflated with the claim that fines fail 
as punishment. Most frequently, this second claim takes the form that 
corporate fines, and corporate punishment generally, harm innocent 
individuals. I explore this assertion at Part II.C, but it is worth making explicit 
now that we are dealing with two distinct criticisms. For example, a cruel and 
unusual punishment is (by definition) punishment. It need not be ineffective as 
a punishment in order to be unconstitutional; rather, separate moral and 
political judgments caution the prohibition of punishments that are cruel and 
unusual. With respect to fines, the fact that they might harm innocent 
individuals would constitute a further reason to consider their usage 
problematic, but this worry is distinct from asserting that fines fail to perform 
the job for which they are intended.
For now, I defend the narrower position that corporate-criminal fines fail 
as punishment qua punishment. It is a further question, discussion of which I 
reserve until Part IV, whether we ought to use corporate-criminal fines 
provided that we could reform them into a successful version of punishment.
B. Corporate-Criminal Fines as a Failed Method of Punishment
Despite being a paradigmatic, ubiquitous form of criminal punishment, the 
corporate fine is deeply flawed. Judged against the standard justifications for 
criminal punishment, corporate-criminal fines do not seem to serve any
rationale—or, at least, they do not serve any well.
                                                                                                                     
22 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012).
23 See id.
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1. Fines as Deterrence
The received wisdom, for better or worse, is that corporate punishment 
exists almost exclusively to deter prospective misconduct. Regina Robson, in 
cataloguing discussions of corporate punishment, concludes that there has 
occurred a “virtual elimination of retribution as an acknowledged goal of 
[corporate-]criminal sanctioning,” with only deterrence offered to explain why 
the state should hold corporations criminally responsible;24 Vik Khanna agrees 
that “deterrence, not retribution, [is] the aim of . . . corporate criminal 
liability.”25 Pity then that fines are a famously poor deterrent of corporate 
crime.
One reason that fines are a poor deterrent is that corporate crime is
infrequently prosecuted and that convicted corporations historically receive 
modest fines.26 Although the average fine from 1999 to 2012 was
approximately $7.4 million, the median fine was less than $120,000.27 On the 
other hand, recently there have been signs of larger financial penalties for 
convicted corporations. In 2014, several financial firms received criminal 
penalties well in excess of $1 billion each,28 although a large portion of these 
penalties consist in restitution payments to victims.29 This trend has continued 
in 2015; for example, five domestic banks pleaded guilty to a criminal 
conspiracy involving currency manipulation, for which they too received 
penalties well in excess of $1 billion.30 It remains to be seen whether this trend 
will continue.
                                                                                                                     
24 Regina A. Robson, Crime and Punishment: Rehabilitating Retribution as a 
Justification for Organizational Criminal Liability, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 109, 121 (2010).
25 V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1494 & n.91 (1996).
26 Memorandum from the Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to All Component 
Heads & U.S. Att’ys (June 16, 1999), http://federalevidence.com/pdf/Corp_Prosec/Holder_
Memo_6_16_99.pdf [https://perma.cc/NFW8-J8H9] (“[A] prosecutor may consider the 
corporation’s willingness to make restitution and steps already taken to do so . . . in 
determining whether to charge the corporation.”); Fine and Punishment, ECONOMIST (July 
21, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21559315 [https://perma.cc/2
BNZ-9YJD].
27 Sourcebook Archives, supra note 9.
28 W.R. Thomas, How and Why Should the Criminal Law Punish Corporations? 113
n.38 (2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with author) 
(listing Credit Suisse ($2.6 billion in criminal penalties), BNP Paribas ($8.9 billion in 
criminal penalties), and JP Morgan Chase ($2.6 billion in criminal and civil penalties)).
29 Sensibly, the Guidelines acknowledge that restitution is not punishment. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, pt. B introductory cmt. (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015).
30 David McLaughlin et al., Six Banks Pay $5.8 Billion, Five Guilty of Market 
Rigging, BLOOMBERG (May 20, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 2015-05-
20/six-banks-pay-5-8-billion-five-plead-guilty-to-market-rigging [https://perma.cc/C9AW-
T2CV].
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Regardless, there is reason for skepticism that even large fines 
meaningfully deter corporations. For one thing, it is likely impossible to set 
fines at the appropriate price to deter misconduct. Even assuming reasonable 
rates of enforcement, John Coffee demonstrates that the optimal fine for 
deterring even minor criminal activity would far outstrip the value of most 
corporations, leading to a mismatched calculus that he refers to as the 
“deterrence trap.”31 Vince Buccola’s research on corporate insolvency implies 
that the deterrence trap, when considered diachronically, is even more of a 
problem than Coffee suspected.32 Buccola notes that the interest of 
shareholders and managers diverge proportionally as a corporation approaches 
insolvency; officers become increasingly willing to act in their short-term 
interest, even if it is to the detriment of shareholders.33 A similar logic informs 
corporate crime. The closer a corporation moves towards insolvency, the more 
mismatched becomes the deterrence trap—in particular, the less a large fine 
acts as a deterrent. Accordingly, at a time of looming insolvency, when a 
corporation might be most inclined to stave off collapse by engaging in 
criminal activity, criminal fines offer the least deterrence.
Separately, the magnitude of a fine cannot be calculated independently of 
enforcement rates. It is well documented that large punishments can actually 
discourage enforcement.34 For example, the risk of bankrupting a corporation 
may well dissuade prosecutors from rigorously enforcing the law. To that end, 
according to Brandon Garrett “[t]he DOJ suffered great criticism following 
[Arthur] Andersen’s collapse and has since moderated its approach to 
explicitly take into account collateral consequences in organizational cases.”35
Finally, the corporate fine’s force as a deterrent is undermined by one of 
several agent/principle problems at the core of corporate law. As Larry 
Summers quips, “Managers do not find it personally costly to part with even 
billions of dollars of their shareholders’ money . . . . Paying with shareholders’
money as the price of protecting themselves is a very attractive trade-off.”36
This worry bears out empirically and anecdotally. It is the central rationale 
offered by Professors Alexander and Cohen’s economic research into 
corporate crime, which concludes that “[t]here is little evidence that increasing 
the magnitude of monetary sanctions has a deterrent effect.”37 Anecdotally, 
                                                                                                                     
31 Coffee, supra note 5, at 390.
32 Vincent S.J. Buccola, Beyond Insolvency, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2013).
33 Id.
34 Ehud Guttel & Doron Teichman, Criminal Sanctions in the Defense of the 
Innocent, 110 MICH. L. REV. 597, 597 (2012) (collecting examples).
35 Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 880 
(2007).
36 Lawrence Summers, Companies on Trial: Are They ‘Too Big to Jail’?, FIN. TIMES
(Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e3bf9954-7009-11e4-90af -00144feabdc0.html
[https://perma.cc/ZCD7-Q6FT].
37 Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Causes of Corporate Crime: An 
Economic Perspective, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 4, at 11, 24.
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consider the recent conduct of several financial institutions after pleading 
guilty to manipulating currency markets.38 These institutions acknowledged 
wrongdoing both in a guilty plea and in a mandatory disclosure notice to 
investors.39 Yet, a second client letter—one that several institutions attached to 
the disclosure notice itself!—informed investors that their institutions would 
continue to engage in potentially criminal conduct specifically identified in the 
guilty plea but that was not itself the basis for the instant antitrust conviction.40
2. Retributivism, Fines, and Corporations
There is a widespread view that “corporate criminal liability cannot be 
justified retributively.”41 Underlying this is anxiety about whether 
corporations, even if they can be subjected to criminal liability, are the kinds 
of agents—in particular, moral agents—for which retribution is applicable or 
appropriate.
The moral status and capacity of corporate agents is a contentious and 
somewhat unfocused topic. If all that critics have in mind is that corporations 
must be responsive to the sorts of normative considerations that arise in the 
criminal law, then I see no basis for their complaints.42 For my part, I am 
inclined towards this minimal account of the preconditions of legal retribution. 
Corporations have free will in a narrow sense: they can deliberate and act 
consistent with their self-identified interests and separate from outside 
pressures.43 Corporations are willing participants in broad swaths of our 
normative practices, even if they may not be objects of moral consideration in 
and of themselves.44 For example, through contract law, corporations routinely 
                                                                                                                     
38 Michael Corkery & Ben Protess, Rigging of Foreign Exchange Market Makes 
Felons of Top Banks, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/05/21/business/dealbook/5-big-banks-to-pay-billions-and-plead-guilty-in-currency-
and-interest-rate-cases.html [https://perma.cc/E2FE-826R].
39 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty
Pleas (May 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-
guilty-pleas [https://perma.cc/PDG4-NZLH].
40 Matt Levine, Banks Will Keep Doing FX Stuff That Got Them in Trouble,
BLOOMBERG (May 21, 2015), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-05-21/banks-
will-keep-doing-fx-stuff-that-got-them-in-trouble [https://perma.cc/2344-AXFB].
41 Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 HASTINGS
L.J. 1, 8 (2012).
42 See infra Part II.B (discussing the capacities of corporate agents). At the other 
extreme, some require far less to qualify for moral personhood. See Tracy Isaacs, 
Collective Moral Responsibility and Collective Intention, 30 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 59, 61 
(2006) (“To the extent that they have the capacity to act on the basis of intentions, 
corporations and other similarly structured organizations are moral persons.”).
43 See Margaret Gilbert, Who’s to Blame? Collective Moral Responsibility and Its 
Implications for Group Members, 30 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 94, 99–100 (2006).
44 Cf. Dietmar von der Pfordten, Five Elements of Normative Ethics - A General 
Theory of Normative Individualism, 15 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 449, 452 (2012)
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2017] CORPORATE CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 613
participate in a normatively laden practice akin to promising.45 More 
generally, inasmuch as corporate attitudes derive from the contributions of 
individuals who themselves are uncontroversially moral agents—more on this 
later—it would be surprising that every emergent corporate attitude would be 
stripped of normative content.46
However, if critics demand something more robust—Michael Moore and 
Amy Sepinwall suggest that personhood requires an emotional capacity
capable of manifesting what philosophers call “reactive attitudes”;47 Michael 
McKenna suggests that robust moral agency requires a free will in some deep 
Kantian sense48—then claims of corporate moral agency are more 
complicated. That is not to say that the possibility of robust moral agency is 
beyond reach. David Silver, as well as Gunnar Björnsson and Kendy Hess, 
argue that corporations are in fact Strawsonian agents capable of reactive 
attitudes sufficient to give rise to moral agency.49 Margaret Gilbert has
extended her schema for collective attitudes to include some collective 
emotions.50 Bryce Huebner, relying on an account broadly similar to Gilbert’s, 
has offered a detailed account of what it would look like for a collective to 
experience fear.51 Peter French has done something of the same for corporate 
shame.52
Needless to say, it is well beyond the scope of this project to offer a full 
resolution of the moral status of collective entities generally and corporate 
agents particularly. Nevertheless, it is consistent with our criminal practice to 
impose punishment on corporations notwithstanding reservations about their 
retributive capacities.53 Fines, and corporate punishment generally, are still 
                                                                                                                     
the justificatory source of morals and ethics. Collective entities . . . cannot fulfill this 
function.” (emphasis omitted)).
45 See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF 
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (2d ed. 2015).
46 CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND
STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 160 (2011).
47 MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
614–17 (1997); Sepinwall, supra note 5, at 428–30. Philosophers identify as reactive 
attitudes those that express our holding others responsible—examples include anger, 
blame, gratitude, forgiveness, resentment, etc.—and presuppose our participation in 
personal relationships with the agents who are the source and/or target of our holding these 
attitudes. P.F. Strawson, Philosophical Lecture: Freedom and Resentment (May 9, 1962), 
reprinted in 48 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 187, 195 (1963).
48 Michael McKenna, Collective Responsibility and an Agent Meaning Theory, 30 
MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 16, 23–29 (2006).
49 Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess, Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive 
Attitudes of Corporate Agents, 94 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 273, 273–74 (2017); 
David Silver, A Strawsonian Defense of Corporate Moral Responsibility, 42 AM. PHIL. Q.
279, 279 (2005).
50 Gilbert, supra note 43, at 100.
51 Bryce Huebner, Genuinely Collective Emotions, 1 EURO J. PHIL. SCI. 89, 95 (2011).
52 French, supra note 5, at 22–26.
53 See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
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justifiable even if corporations are not the kind of fully formed moral agents 
for which retribution is a prerequisite. No one punishment need necessarily 
convey all rationales.54 With respect to retribution specifically, the law 
mitigates its punishment of minors and the mentally disabled largely out of 
concerns about robust moral agency.55 Yet mitigation is not exemption; these 
classes are nevertheless susceptible to criminal liability and punishment.56
Separately, current ineligibility for retributive-style rationales would not 
preclude arguments that the state’s legal regime would benefit from a practice 
of treating corporations as though they are capable of retribution.57 Indeed, 
Christian List and Philip Pettit note the value of such a practice: by treating 
corporations as though they are capable moral agents, we may educate them to 
actually become moral agents.58
All that said, a more mundane, but more pressing problem is that fines—at 
least in the corporate context—are a poor vehicle to express retribution.59 The 
reasons why tie into the next Part.
3. Fines as Promoting Respect for Law
Perhaps the most common lay criticism of corporate liability and 
punishment,60 one echoed just as frequently by criminal law scholars,61 is that 
corporations treat fines simply as “the cost of doing business.” This complaint 
segues into the final failure to consider, which is the corporate-criminal fine’s
failure to express the sort of social judgment expected to attend a criminal 
judgment.
                                                                                                                     
54 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000) (“Supervised release 
fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.”).
55 E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571–72 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 318–19 (2002); see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464–66 (2012) 
(discussing children’s moral development).
56 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306.
57 See generally Robson, supra note 24 (suggesting retribution rather than deterrence 
as the primary goal of criminal law).
58 LIST & PETTIT, supra note 46, at 168–69; accord Joel Feinberg, Collective 
Responsibility, 65 J. PHIL. 674, 677 (1968).
59 See French, supra note 5, at 19–22.
60 E.g., Danielle Kurtzleben, Bank of America’s $17 Billion Penalty Is Arguable Too 
Little, Definitely Too Late, VOX (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.vox.com/2014/8/8/5979563/b
ank-of-americas-17-billion-penalty-is-arguably-too-little-definitely [https://perma.cc/7FKP
-VPA8]; Katie Thomas & Michael S. Schmidt, Glaxo Agrees to Pay $3 Billion in Fraud 
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/business/glaxo
smithkline-agrees-to-pay-3-billion-in-fraudsettlement.html [https://perma.cc/L9Z6-QXEU].
61 E.g., Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN.
L. REV. 271, 278 (2008); Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential 
for Rehabilitation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1426–27 (2009); Dan M. Kahan, Social 
Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 619 (1998); French, 
supra note 5, at 20.
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“Expressive theories of law are concerned with evaluating state action”
and particularly whether that action conveys “the appropriate attitudes toward 
persons.”62 The state expresses itself through a variety of methods including 
lawmaking,63 enforcement (or the lack thereof) of existing laws,64 and, of 
course, punishment.65
According to expressive theories of law, one vital function of the law, and 
equally its enforcement, is to convey and reaffirm the right sort of moral or 
social judgments underpinning a particular law—that is, expressive theories 
“assert that state action is required to express.”66
Expressive theories have considerable traction with respect to criminal law 
scholarship. As Henry Hart famously put the point: “What distinguishes a 
criminal from a civil sanction . . . is the judgment of community condemnation 
which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”67 Likewise, Dan Kahan 
recognizes that the criminalization of certain activities over others reflect the 
background social meanings ordinarily associated with such activities:
Economic competition may impoverish a merchant every bit as much as theft. 
The reason that theft but not competition is viewed as wrongful, on this 
account, is that against the background of social norms theft expresses 
disrespect for the injured party’s moral worth whereas competition (at least 
ordinarily) does not.68
Thus, it is understood that through criminal law “we communicate far 
more about our condemnation of wrongdoing when we call conduct criminal, 
whether the defendant is a corporation or an individual.”69 On this view, “[a]s 
an expression of the community’s moral judgment, there is a significant value 
to applying the criminal law to organizations that act through their agents, 
apart from any instrumental benefits from having a coercive means available 
to deter certain conduct.”70
                                                                                                                     
62 Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General 
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV., 1503, 1520 (2000).
63 See generally id.
64 See Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 860 (2014); 
Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the Deterrence Paradigm to 
Examine the Social Meaning of Declining Prosecution of Elite Crime, 45 CONN. L. REV.
865, 916 (2013).
65 Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 397 
(1965).
66 Anderson & Pildes, supra note 62, at 1520.
67 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401, 404 (1958).
68 Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 420 
(1999) (footnote omitted).
69 David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and 
the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1343–44 (2013).
70 Henning, supra note 61, at 1427.
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If corporate-criminal liability is a valuable practice according to the 
expressive theorist, then why do I nevertheless insist that fines are a failure? 
The reason has to do with the role of actions in expressing our underlying 
judgments. As Anderson and Pildes put the point:
Expressive mental states may be viewed as potentialities that can be 
realized in more than one expression. They are mere potentialities in the 
sense that they require expression to be fully realized.
. . . .
. . . We can evaluate any vehicle of expression, whether a statement or 
action, in terms of how well it expresses its mental states.71
The mere condemnation of conduct as criminal does not suffice, at least in 
our system, to distinguish conduct. We cannot isolate condemnation from the 
carrying out of punishment—what Feinberg refers to under the blanket term 
“hard treatment”72—that embodies our expression of condemnation. Thus, 
while it is true that criminal judgments are understood to express 
condemnation more severe than civil judgments, the state conveys, and buoys, 
this convention by accompanying criminal judgments with uniquely harsh 
punishments.73 Conversely, where criminal and civil sanctions are 
indistinguishable, the state’s expression of uniquely criminal condemnation is 
blunted.74
This gets to the point of the cost-of-doing-business problem. I take the root 
of the problem here to be the fact that corporate fines are treated and perceived 
as no different than any other business cost. This is true prospectively in 
weighing the decision to commit a crime. By this, I take critics to mean that a 
corporation commits crimes after calculating criminality to be in the 
corporation’s best interest. This sort of calculation tracks Gary Becker’s
economic analysis of corporate crime, whereby a person’s decision to commit 
a crime is a function of the benefit to be gained by the crime, weighed against 
the likelihood of detection (enforcement) and the severity of the sanction 
(punishment).75 Paying a fine may well be worth the benefits of criminality; 
after all, it is easy to forget that “agent crimes often benefit organizations and 
are committed for that reason.”76 Fines, from this perspective, act as licenses 
retroactively permitting the corporation’s misconduct. This same calculation 
and criticism apply after the fact. That is, a corporation absorbs the cost of a 
                                                                                                                     
71 Anderson & Pildes, supra note 62, at 1507 (emphasis added).
72 Feinberg, supra note 65, at 400.
73 DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION 22 (2008).
74 See Samuel W. Buell, Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Civil Liability, in 
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 4, at 87, 93–96.
75 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN 
THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1, 2 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes 
eds., 1974).
76 Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J.
473, 495–96 (2006).
2017] CORPORATE CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 617
criminal fine in exactly the same way that it absorbs any other business cost—
a civil fine,77 for example, or even just an exogenous shock from a bad 
investment or a disappointing quarterly performance. In all of these instances, 
the costs hit the corporation, and immediately distribute down (primarily) to 
the shareholders.78
The failure of corporate-criminal fines is that, as a sanction purportedly 
expressing particularly severe condemnation, they nevertheless are 
indistinguishable from civil sanctions. Indeed, in a perversion of the idea that 
criminal condemnation is reserved for conduct worse than that deserving a 
civil judgment, corporations outside of heavily regulated industries may prefer 
a criminal fine over a civil penalty, as the former will likely be smaller than 
the latter.79 That criminal and civil sanctions are mostly indistinguishable, and 
their effects further indistinguishable from poor managerial performance, 
blunts the harsh expression of condemnation a corporate conviction is intended 
to deliver.80 In a slogan, the expressive problem with corporate-criminal fines 
is that there is nothing uniquely criminal about corporate fines.
C. How Not to Evaluate Corporate Punishment
I have yet to consider what some take to be the central failure of corporate 
punishment: the harm it inflicts on innocent individuals. On this view, 
corporate-criminal fines fail because they invariably punish individuals within 
the corporation who were not subject to the criminal process or afforded its 
procedural protections and who may well have played no part in the 
underlying misconduct giving rise to the corporate prosecution. Stephen 
Bainbridge pithily captures the sentiment: “When you punish an entity, you’re 
really punishing the entity’s shareholders.”81 In this, he echoes Glanville 
Williams’ assertion that “a fine imposed on the corporation is in reality aimed 
against shareholders who are not . . . responsible for the crime, i.e., is aimed 
against innocent persons.”82 This critique is as old as corporate-criminal 
liability itself. When first considering Congress’s ability to extend criminal 
statutes to corporations, the Supreme Court explicitly addressed (and, notably, 
                                                                                                                     
77 The major difference seems to concern tax implications. See Lynnley Browning, 
Too Big to Tax: Settlements Are Tax Write-Offs for Banks, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 27, 2014), 
http://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/07/giant-penalties-are-giant-tax-write-offs-wall-street-
279993.html [https://perma.cc/E8F2-BJ39].
78 See infra Part III.B.
79 See generally Vikramaditya Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political 
Economy Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95 (2004) (identifying conditions under which a 
corporate conviction is preferable to civil or regulatory alternatives).
80 Buell, supra note 74, at 94–95.
81 What the NY Times Doesn’t Understand About Organizational Wrongdoing,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 14, 2015), http://www.professor bainbridge.com/profes
sorbainbridgecom/2015/05/what-the-ny-times-doesnt-understand-about-organizational-wro
ngdoing.html [https://perma.cc/RDB3-UTLG].
82 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 863 (2d ed. 1961).
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rejected) characterizations “that to . . . punish the corporation is in reality to 
punish the innocent stockholders.”83
That corporate punishment distributes harm to innocent individuals, taken 
by itself, provides no support for the proposition that fines fail as a form of
punishment. The fact of third-party harm is a reliable, perhaps inescapable, 
consequence of punishment.84 To treat this fact as fatal to punishment in the 
corporate context is to employ unreasonable standards against corporate 
punishment twice over—once with respect to criminal law and once with 
respect to corporate law. But even granting to critics these heightened 
standards, nevertheless the arguments offered or implied are themselves 
invalid; as I demonstrate here the conclusions asserted do not follow from the 
premises offered.
First, however, it is worth pausing to unpack this dialectic. For one thing, 
we should be clear on what the failure of corporate-criminal fines is, and what 
the failure is not, before attempting a diagnosis or remedy. For another, the 
claim that corporate punishment fails because it punishes individuals gets its 
purchase, on my view, by conflating two separate domains, criminal law and 
corporate law, and obfuscating the application of reasons appropriate to one 
domain impermissibly into the other domain.85 Inasmuch as this Article is 
intended to make explicit the overlooked connections between corporate law 
and criminal law, it seems appropriate before continuing to disambiguate the 
actual failure of corporate-criminal fines from this specious, albeit common, 
criticism.
1. Corporate-Criminal Punishment and Impossible Standards
Start with the obvious: corporate-criminal fines result in harm being 
distributed to individuals. Despite the fact that the state imposes its 
punishment against the corporation and not any individual, “[a]s in any other 
sanction or taxation scheme, the impact point is not necessarily the final 
resting point, or incidence, of the burden.”86 On the standard picture, “the 
[most] widely used form of corporate punishment, fine, will cause economic 
detriment to innocent shareholders” in the form of diminished equity value.87
Albert Alschuler describes the effect a bit more broadly: “Innocent 
shareholders pay the fines, and innocent employees, creditors, customers, and 
communities sometimes feel the pinch too.”88 For any given case, we safely 
                                                                                                                     
83 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492 (1909).
84 See id.
85 See infra Part IV.
86 Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 377 (2003).
87 Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 47 
(1957); accord PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 190 
(1984).
88 Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1367 (2009).
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assume that a vast majority of individuals to whom harm is distributed are 
innocent—that is, they have not been convicted of the same or substantially 
similar misconduct as has the corporation.89 Moreover, many are not culpable 
inasmuch as they did not personally contribute to the sanctionable 
misconduct—for example, by carrying out the misconduct, authorizing it, or 
creating conditions that cannot be satisfied without resort to criminality—nor 
did they stand in a position to prevent it.90
So, corporate-criminal punishment distributes harm to innocent, 
nonculpable individuals. However, in this respect, corporate-criminal fines are 
like any individual punishment. Punishment, be it individual or corporate, 
carries a messy, spillover quality with it. Consider the effects of an 
individual’s incarceration: family and friends lose access to a loved one, 
employers lose an employee, and citizens pay for an inmate’s care.91 The 
imposition of punishment reliably—indeed, barring highly contrived
examples, invariably—results in harm being distributed to innocent, 
nonculpable individuals.92 Indeed, Daryl Levinson argues that this spillover 
effect blurs any clear distinction between individual and collective 
punishments.93 On his view, “many sanctioning regimes that are de jure 
individual should be understood as de facto collective.”94 No surprise, then, 
that the Department of Justice reassures its prosecutors that “[a]lmost every 
conviction of a corporation, like almost every conviction of an individual, will 
have an impact on innocent third parties.”95
Thus, if the problem of corporate-criminal fines were merely that they 
distributed harm to innocent parties, I would say it is no problem at all—or, at 
least, not one unique to corporate punishment. Absent justification for treating 
corporate punishment differently from individual punishment with respect to 
their distributive consequences, arguing against punishment on this basis 
                                                                                                                     
89 Indeed, as Garrett notes, “More often than not, when the largest corporations are 
prosecuted federally, individuals aren’t charged.” James B. Stewart, In Corporate Crimes, 
Individual Accountability Is Elusive, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2015) (quoting Professor 
Brandon L. Garrett), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/20/business/in-corporate-crimes-
individual-accountability-is-elusive.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/MC5Z-SDM9].
90 But see CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE
162 (2000) (discussing membership responsibility).
91 Indeed, the social cost of prison informs Judge Posner’s suggestion that white-
collar criminals receive a fine instead of imprisonment. Posner, supra note 11, at 415. But 
cf. Is Charging Inmates to Stay in Prison Smart Policy?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.,
https://www.brennancenter.org/states-pay-stay-charges [https://perma.cc/CJ2P-G2RA] 
(identifying states that require inmates to repay costs of incarceration).
92 FRENCH, supra note 87, at 188; Buell, supra note 76, at 522–23; French, supra note 
5, at 21.
93 Levinson, supra note 86, at 378.
94 Id.
95 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.1100 cmt. B (2015) (emphasis 
added) [hereinafter U.S.A.M.], https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000-principles-
federal-prosecution-business-organizations#9-28.010 [https://perma.cc/8HPB-4H2A].
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amounts to an ad hoc invocation of a double standard that no form of 
punishment can reliably satisfy.
There is a second sense in which the criticism of corporate-criminal fines 
imposes a double standard—this time between harms imposed on a 
corporation through punishment and all other harms imposed on a corporation. 
After all, that harms imposed on a corporation distribute to stakeholders within 
the corporation is not an occurrence unique to criminal law.96 Corporate harms 
reliably distribute down to shareholders (and employees and consumers) 
irrespective of whether they arise from a criminal fine, a civil sanction, poor 
managerial decisionmaking, or an exogenous market shock.97 Indeed, that the 
distribution of harm is consistent across inciting incidents is a primary reason 
for perceiving criminal fines as the cost of doing business.
True, there is a normative consideration here; we should care about the 
distributions of burdens across groups of individuals.98 The category error
occurs when we import criminal law considerations of guilt and innocence into 
the conversation. What role, precisely, does an individual’s innocence play 
here? We do not impose damages on shareholders because they personally are 
tortfeasors, because they breached the corporation’s contracts, or because they 
implemented the company’s flawed business plan. No one seriously entertains 
the idea that a shareholder should avoid bearing the cost of a poor managerial 
decision merely because he is “innocent” of making the decision. Rather, the 
harm falls to them because the structure of a corporation, and the function of 
corporate law, is to distribute the benefits and burdens attributable to the 
corporate entity to various individuals.99 Guilt and innocence are the purview 
of criminal law; distribution of harm is (with respect to corporations) the 
purview of corporate law. I address this point at length in Part IV, and so hold 
off on further explication for now.
2. Intentional vs. Foreseeable Harm
Critics continue to argue that the harm distributed through corporate 
punishment is different in kind to harm distributed through individual 
punishment. Corporate punishment, in their view, is categorically worse than 
individual punishment. There are two interpretations for assertions that the 
harm distributed via corporate punishment is different in kind from, and 
categorically worse than, the harm distributed via individual punishment. 
Neither interpretation is compelling.
                                                                                                                     
96 See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 4.3 (2d ed. 2010) 
(discussing bases for shareholder derivative suits to recover corporate harms that befall 
shareholders).
97 Id.
98 Avia Pasternak, The Distributive Effect of Collective Punishment, in
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR COLLECTIVE WRONGDOING 210, 210 (Tracy Isaacs & Richard 
Vernon eds., 2011).
99 See infra Part IV.
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The first interpretation assigns a morally significant difference between 
intending and foreseeing—a strategy associated with the doctrine of double 
effect.100 This interpretation especially matches Alschuler’s assertion that 
“[t]he penalties imposed on innocent shareholders and employees when 
corporations are convicted are not incidental, collateral, or secondary. They are 
what the punishment of a collective entity is all about.”101
The philosophical literature is littered with thought experiments meant to 
capture the intuition that a wrong done intentionally for its own sake is worse 
than the same action taken under circumstances where the wrong was salient, 
but not intended, by the agent.102 Roughly, according to the Doctrine of 
Double Effect, what grounds the divergence in intuitions is the subjective 
attitudes of the wrongdoer; an outcome that would be permissible (or less 
morally problematic) if merely foreseeable but unintended becomes 
impermissible (or morally worse) by virtue of being intended.103
I am skeptical that the conceptual distinction between intending and 
foreseeing, to the extent there is one, can bear the normative weight that 
Alschuler and others seems to think it does. Elsewhere I have argued against 
the coherence of the Doctrine of Double Effect as it would apply to the 
criminal law on these grounds.104 Briefly, endorsing the view that intending 
and merely foreseeing delineate the timbre of moral (and legal) judgments 
elevates obviously irrelevant factual considerations to the status of decisive 
determinants of moral and legal permissibility.105
Regardless, there is a more pressing challenge facing those who would 
render corporate punishment categorically indefensible. This is the so-called 
Closeness Problem that consistently plagues the defense of the Doctrine of 
Double Effect.106 In essence, many so-labeled “intending” cases can be 
plausibly redescribed as “foreseeing” cases, and vice versa. Worse, there exist 
                                                                                                                     
100 The Doctrine of Double Effect is often attributed to Thomas Aquinas. Thomas 
Aquinas, Of Murder, in 3 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. II-II q. 64, art. 7,
at 1465 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981) 
(1911).
101 Alschuler, supra note 88, at 1369.
102 See generally T.M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS: PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING,
BLAME (2008).
103 Alison McIntyre, Doctrine of Double Effect, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/ [https://perma.cc/T96H-WG8Z] (last revised 
Sept. 23, 2014).
104 W. Robert Thomas, Note, On Strict Liability Crimes: Preserving a Moral 
Framework for Criminal Intent in an Intent-Free Moral World, 110 MICH. L. REV. 647, 
663–66 (2012).
105 Id. at 664–65.
106 See, e.g., JONATHAN BENNETT, THE ACT ITSELF 204–05 (1995); H.L.A. HART,
Intention and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 113, 123 (1968); Philippa 
Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, in KILLING AND 
LETTING DIE 266, 268–69 (Bonnie Steinbock & Alastair Norcross eds., 2d ed. 1994). See 
generally EZIO DI NUCCI, ETHICS WITHOUT INTENTION 103–32 (2014) (cataloguing failed 
efforts to circumvent the Closeness Problem).
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no independent standards for determining which description is “correct”
(assuming a correct description exists as a coherent notion).107 The worry, 
then, is that an individual privileges a description only because it supports her 
pretheoretic moral judgment, which the appeal to intending/foreseeing was 
meant to elicit and ground.108 In other words, appeals to the Doctrine of 
Double Effect risk begging the question.
Claims against corporate punishment of the sort above suffer acutely from 
the Closeness Problem. Critics assert that the goal of corporate punishment is 
to harm shareholders—that is, the state intends to harm innocent 
individuals.109 (The implicit presumption is that harm experienced by innocent 
individuals is merely foreseeable in the individual context).110 However, there 
are not strong, independent reasons to accept this characterization of the state’s
conduct. First, it is not clear why the state would want to harm innocent 
shareholders, particularly as it has long been the case that shareholders have 
few, weak levers to reform a corporation.111 Second, the state already has an 
institution of individual liability and punishment viz., criminal law as applied 
to individuals. Third, the state has ample reasons to hold corporations 
criminally responsible separate from their members. Chief among them is that 
conduct not reducible to individuals nevertheless remains criminal; the state 
has a duty to its citizens, and especially victims, to hold perpetrators 
responsible, be they individual or corporate.112 It just so happens the state uses 
punishment, which spills over on individuals, to express condemnation.113
3. Corporate vs. Individual Experiences of Harm
Consider a separate, albeit related interpretation of the characterizations 
given by critics like Bainbridge, Williams, and Alschuler114—viz., that the 
harm distributed from corporate punishment is categorically worse. This 
second interpretation leverages the fact that a corporation experiences inputs, 
                                                                                                                     
107 See, e.g., Dan Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the 
Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 851–52 (2012).
108 Neil Levy, Neuroethics: A New Way of Doing Ethics, 2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 
NEUROSCIENCE, Apr.–June 2011, at 6.
109 Alschuler, supra note 88, at 1369.
110 Id. at 1368–69.
111 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2011).
112 For a full treatment of this point, see W. Robert Thomas, We Can, Should, and 
(Very Nearly) Do Hold Corporations Criminally Responsible 78–82 (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author).
113 It is a broad topic—one well beyond the scope of this Article—the limits to which 
the State can punish as a means of enforcing its criminal judgments. On the flip side, it is a 
live question whether there could exist a public institution of criminal responsibility that 
did not enforce its judgments by imposing harm. See Feinberg, supra note 65, at 400. It 
suffices for my purposes to observe that, irrespective of whether we could have such an 
institution, manifestly we do not.
114 See supra notes 81–88.
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or harm among them, differently than do individuals.115 In ordinary cases of 
individual punishment, the convicted individual experiences harm directly 
from his punishment; innocent parties experience harm derivatively from the 
convict’s suffering.116 For example, “[w]hen an offender with children is sent 
to prison, his children may suffer, yet criminal justice officials may have no 
way to punish the offender appropriately without hurting other people.”117 On 
this view, third-party harm is dependent on the convict’s harm.118 By contrast, 
suggests the critic, a corporation cannot experience harm on its own.119
Accordingly, the harm of punishment passes entirely through to innocent
shareholders; their suffering is not derivative of or arising alongside the 
corporation’s suffering of harm.120 Rather, the harm experienced by 
individuals is a substitute for the corporation experiencing harm.
There are two problems here. First, it is not clear why innocents’ suffering 
must derive from the suffering of the guilty. The occurrence is reliable, but it 
is not obvious how the suffering of a guilty person grounds the permissible 
suffering of innocents.121 Rather, it seems more likely that a state’s fulfilling 
its penological obligations grounds the excusable distribution of harm to 
innocents. But this grounding claim would apply equally to the corporate 
setting as to the individual one.
Relatedly, there is a presumption here that punishment is to be delineated 
by the fact that it imposes the experience of harm.122 But this adds an 
unnecessary and controversial step. One might have thought that punishment 
imposes harm; the experience of suffering follows from that imposition but is 
not the defining feature. As David Lewis points out, if the state is interested in 
punishment as suffering, then we are seeking to normalize the wrong 
constraint when we talk about, say, equal punishment; courts should be 
interested in whether Jim’s subjective misery is commensurate with John’s
misery in sentencing them to the same punishment, even if that means one will 
face considerably more jail time.123 Richard Posner makes a similar 
observation that equality in punishment is a concept and calculation distinct 
from equality in the experience of punishment.124
Second, there is an equivocation driving the force of the critic’s argument. 
The argument starts with an uncontroversial premise: the legal entity that is a 
                                                                                                                     
115 See Alschuler, supra note 88, at 1368–69.
116 See id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 1367–68.
119 Id. at 1367–69, 1392.
120 Id. at 1367.
121 See Feinberg, supra note 58, at 680 (partially defending historical regimes that 
relied on collective-criminal responsibility).
122 David Lewis, The Punishment That Leaves Something to Chance, 18 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 53, 61–62 (1989).
123 Id. at 62.
124 Posner, supra note 11, at 410–15.
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corporation does not experience the sensation of harm in the same way, if at 
all, that an individual experiences harm. Now, if the complaint were that 
corporations cannot experience harm like individuals experience harm, then it 
would be irrelevant. Just because a corporation does not have the single body 
and sense organs of an individual person, it does not preclude the fact that 
there is a meaningful sense in which a corporation can experience harm.125
This observation is merely a specific instance of a more general principle that 
has been a bedrock of our legal treatment of corporations dating back at least 
to the founding; abandoning it would come at unimaginable cost to the modern 
corporation.126
And so the critic employs a stronger claim—viz., corporations do not 
experience harm at all (or do not experience harm except through the suffering 
their members). But these stronger claims do not follow from the former, and 
themselves are false. Corporations obviously can be harmed, and plausibly can 
experience harm: they can have their charters to exist revoked, their property 
seized, or their internal structures forcibly reworked in ways that severely 
impair the corporation from pursuing its goals.127 Corporations can even 
conceivably experience harm not also experienced by the membership. For 
one, there is weak evidence of this possibility when shareholders recently saw 
the value of their equity increase upon the announcement of a guilty plea 
against domestic banks.128 For another, a corporation has an internal structure 
that arranges interactions between individuals.129 Harm imposed on a 
corporation’s structure need not harm any given member of the corporation—
indeed, they might benefit from the change—but it would still be fair to 
characterize forced restructuring as harm to the corporation qua corporation.
III. THE INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF CORPORATE AND CRIMINAL LAW
The relationship between corporate law and criminal punishment is not 
obvious—or, it is so obvious as to have gone overlooked in the literature on 
                                                                                                                     
125 See infra Part III.
126 For an extended discussion of the conceptual and historical shortcomings of this 
sort of argument, see generally Thomas, supra note 20, and Part III.
127 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8B2.1, 8D1.4 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015) (structural reform); see also Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate 
Criminal Liability: When Does It Make Sense?, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1437, 1439 (2009) 
(noting that a court’s “opportunity to remedy corporate misbehavior through terms of 
probation is almost endless”); Kyle Noonan, Note, The Case for a Federal Corporate 
Charter Revocation Penalty, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 615–16 (2012) (discussing the 
history of corporate-charter revocation).
128 See Kevin McCoy & Kevin Johnson, 5 Banks Guilty of Rate-Rigging, Pay More 
than $5B, USA TODAY (May 20, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/05/20
/billions-in-bank-fx-settlements/27638443/ [https://perma.cc/L37E-J65R] (noting that three 
of five banks saw their stock value rise by 2% upon the announcement of their guilty 
pleas).
129 See infra Part III.B.
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corporate crime. This should not be necessarily surprising. As a matter of 
psychology, it may be that criminal theorists take corporate law as an 
unchanging feature of the legal landscape. (For their part, corporate law 
theorists appear to treat corporate-criminal liability as innovation whose time 
has come, or else a conceptual mistake.)130 For another, corporate law and 
criminal law exist to serve different regulatory purposes and operate under the 
auspices of diametrically opposed conceptions of the corporation.
A. Competing Agendas and Conceptions of the Corporation
Criminal law operates on a model of prohibition, specifying impermissible 
conduct according to whether a person commits a proscribed act (actus reus)
concurrent with a proscribed attitude (mens rea).131 At least in its idealized 
form,132 the domain of criminal law bears some relationship to the moral 
domain, where the latter grounds the justification for the former in a manner 
that remains contentious among philosophers and legal scholars alike. 
Criminal law by and large takes the person as its object of regulation.133 As a 
result, although corporations are not the sole focus of the corporate law, 
neither are they exempt from its prohibitions.
Corporate law, at least in its modern presentation,134 can be generally 
described as employing a model of enablement rather than prohibition.135
Corporate law provides individuals with a vehicle, one that provides specified 
legal advantages, that enables them to pursue collective, usually commercial,
activity. A great portion of corporate law concerns the effective design and 
construction of such a vehicle: providing an internal corporate structure 
through which individuals can coordinate activity towards a shared goal or 
purpose; designating and distributing rights, powers, and responsibility among 
individuals within a corporation according to the roles they serve; and 
developing rules and principles by which the resultant collective entity 
operates within the larger legal and social world.136
                                                                                                                     
130 E.g., Khanna, supra note 25, at 1532–34.
131 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2 (2d ed. 2003).
132 See generally HUSAK, supra note 73 (canvassing concerns that criminal law has 
divorced from morality).
133 1 LAFAVE, supra note 131, § 1.5.
134 For an overview of corporate law as a tool of active regulation, see JAMES WILLARD 
HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1780–1970 (1970), and Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in 
American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1609 (1988).
135 See Elvin R. Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely “Enabling”?, 50 
CORNELL L.Q. 599, 599 (1965) (citing Wilber G. Katz, The Philosophy of Midcentury 
Corporation Statutes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 177 (1958)).
136 See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8 (2011); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (AM. BAR ASS’N
2010).
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In short, corporate and criminal law serve quite different regulatory 
purposes. They achieve their ends through different regulatory tactics.137 And 
they assign to the corporation different degrees of consideration with respect 
to the domain’s set of object of inquiry.138
Implicit to these different regulatory schemes are different ways of 
conceiving of the corporation; the law takes what we might call a pluralist 
approach about the nature of corporations. Now, there is a massive, centuries-
old debate about what the proper conception of the corporation is,139 and, as a 
corollary, whether something like this sort of pluralism ought to be tolerated. 
Entering that fray is for another project.140 Here it suffices to point out that 
regardless of whether the state ought to be a pluralist about how it conceives of 
corporations, manifestly the state does embrace pluralism. Specifically, 
corporate law and criminal law are committed to different, seemingly 
incompatible, conceptions of the corporation.
Start with criminal law, which I have already described as regulating 
persons on the basis of their actions and mental states. In this respect, criminal 
law does not distinguish corporate persons from individual persons: both 
classes are presumed to be single, autonomous agents capable of acting to 
realize their own interests and of conforming their conduct to the law.141
Criminal law, in other words, takes what Daniel Dennett describes as the 
“intentional stance” towards corporations.142 This involves treating 
corporations “as entities whose behavior can be predicted by the method of 
attributing beliefs, desires, and rational acumen.”143 Criminal law is by no 
means the only legal domain to adopt the intentional stance towards 
corporations. Property, tort, and contract all do the same.144 Nor is doing so 
purely a legal artifice; individuals have demonstrated a propensity for adopting 
the intentional stance towards what social psychologists refer to as a “high 
entitative group”—that is, “a unified and coherent whole in which the 
members are tightly bound together” and which certainly includes 
                                                                                                                     
137 See Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (2008) 
(discussing differences between corporate law and tort/crime models of regulation).
138 Id. at 2.
139 See Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV.
1629, 1639–41.
140 For my part, I am inclined to think not just that the law does embrace pluralism, but 
that it ought to embrace pluralism. See John Dewey, The Historic Background of 
Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 656 (1926).
141 See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, 
unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include 
corporations . . . as well as individuals . . . .”). Title 18, the federal criminal code, 
frequently adopts or declines to override this understanding of “person.” E.g., 18 U.S.C.
§§ 202, 229F, 841, 921, 1341, 1343 (2012).
142 DANIEL C. DENNETT, THE INTENTIONAL STANCE 43–68 (1987).
143 Id. at 49.
144 See Thomas, supra note 20, at 24, 49–54 (discussing the early treatment of 
corporations as single entities for purposes of property, tort, and contract law).
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corporations.145 For the purposes of discussing criminal law, I will refer to this 
way of seeing corporations as the “Persons Conception of Corporations.” 
Corporate law, by contrast, takes a “design-stance” towards corporations, 
such that “a design of a system breaks it up into larger or smaller functional 
parts, and design-stance predictions are generated by assuming that each 
functional part will function properly.”146 Call the approach towards 
corporations embedded in modern corporate law—one that treats corporations 
as systems to be engineered rather than individual, autonomous persons—the
“Systems Conception of the Corporation.” Such an approach is not exclusively 
applicable to corporations; in extreme cases it seems we take just such a 
design stance towards other humans.147 On the other hand, such a practice is 
descriptively uncommon and normatively problematic. For example, a central 
critique of punishment aimed to rehabilitate individual criminals is that in 
doing so, it treats them as systems to be reengineered, thereby failing to 
respect their moral autonomy as free, autonomous persons.148 Moreover, 
certainly there is no broad-scale counterpart to corporate law applicable to 
individuals. Corporate law is sui generis in that it exists only for the 
corporation, and that no counterpart area of law exists to design the internal 
structure of individuals.
So we have two domains of law with drastically different regulatory 
agendas, which are committed to broadly incompatible conceptions of the 
corporation. I say committed because these conceptions are central features of 
their respective domains—we would have to rework profoundly our practices 
of corporate or criminal law were we to abandon pluralism in favor of a single 
conception of the corporation.149 This gets to a broader, but crucial point about 
pluralism. Pluralism across domains does not license pluralism within a
domain, any more than having pluralism about rules between the NFL and 
NCAA does not license pluralistic, inconsistent rules within just the NFL.150
                                                                                                                     
145 Steven J. Sherman & Elise J. Percy, The Psychology of Collective Responsibility: 
When and Why Collective Entities Are Likely to Be Held Responsible for the Misdeeds of 
Individual Members, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 137, 149–50 (2010); see also Mihailis E. Diamantis, 
Corporate Criminal Minds, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2049, 2049 (2016).
146 D.C. Dennett, Intentional Systems, 68 J. PHIL. 87, 88 (1971).
147 See Strawson, supra note 47, at 194–95.
148 VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 355 (2011).
149 See generally Crane, supra note 137 (contrasting the two paradigms). 
Reconceptualization aside, the mere logistics would be a nightmare. For example, the 
federal code and accompanying regulations would have to be revised to specifically 
exclude or include corporations for purposes of criminal liability, rather than presuming 
corporations to be persons. Among other things, this would require actually identifying and 
reevaluating the upwards of 300,000 federal regulations carrying criminal penalties, which 
does not get to the issue of state law. Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s New Harm 
Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1191, 1198–99 (2015).
150 See generally John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955).
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The distinction between pluralism across domains and pluralism within 
domains matters especially for my discussion of criminal law, though a similar 
story could be told about corporate law. In particular, the criminal law cannot 
coherently presuppose that a corporation is a single person at the moment of 
conviction, only to abandon this conception at the moment of punishment and, 
say, go after the individuals “really” responsible.151 To look past the corporate 
person in this manner would undermine the conceptual basis that licensed 
conviction of the corporation in the first place. Analogizing to contract and tort 
law, these domains permit looking past the corporation only under 
circumstances involving the use of the corporate form as a sham or alter ego 
for the intended purpose of immunizing an individual from responsibility.152
The broader point to be made is that corporate and criminal law operate 
for different purposes according to different conceptions of the corporation. 
Where domains of law bump up against one another, invariably those rival 
conceptions must find a means of reconciliation. Those intersections and 
reconciliations occupy the remainder of Part III.
B. Corporate Law Makes Corporate-Criminal Liability Possible
Thus far, I have described two areas of law that serve radically different 
regulatory agendas and embrace diametrically opposed conceptions of the 
corporation. And yet, the purpose of this Article is to reveal the tight 
connections between corporation and criminal law, and especially the ways in 
which the core features of corporate law are responsible for confounding the 
criminal law’s efforts. Let’s begin, then, with the corporate law’s role in 
making it possible to hold corporations criminally responsible in the first 
place.
1. A Bit of Ground-Clearing Regarding Corporate Personhood
What it takes to be eligible for legal personhood is the subject of the next 
Part—a crucial topic both because the criminal law takes persons as its 
standard objects of regulation153 and because corporate eligibility for 
personhood under the criminal law relies heavily on corporate law.154 That 
said, a bit of ground-clearing first about corporate personhood may be 
valuable. Again, my intention is to avoid controversy where I can.
                                                                                                                     
151 This approach would assume, wrongly in my view, that collective responsibility is 
reducible to individual responsibility.
152 See, e.g., Kutty v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 764 F.3d 540, 552–53 (6th Cir. 2014)
(evading illegality), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1162 (2015); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing 
the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1065–67 (1991) 
(undercapitalization).
153 See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 131, § 1.5.
154 See infra Part III.B.4.
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As I understand the current legal landscape, corporations are not legal 
persons. By this, I mean that neither the Supreme Court, nor any other 
legislative or judicial body, has extended to a corporation the entire panoply of 
rights and responsibilities attendant to legal personhood as have been extended 
to individuals.155 Claims that corporations actually are persons simply 
mischaracterize the legal status corporations actually have. On the other hand, 
neither is it accurate to say—though many have—that the law treats 
corporations merely as though they were persons, even though they are really 
not.156 This assertion equivocates between personhood as a legal status and 
personhood as a surrogate or synonym for humanity. Legal personhood, as the 
term suggests, is a legal designation, one made against the backdrop of social 
and political judgments.157 Thus, the conferral of legal personhood with 
respect to some legal domain is no more a fiction or social construct when 
conferred upon a commercial corporation than it is when conferred upon an 
individual.
With respect to personhood as a legal status, I take it to be the case that it 
cannot be extended by mere fiat. A tree cannot be a person under the criminal 
law, even if a court says it is, because granting the tree status as a legal person 
would not affect its ability to conform its conduct to the law.158 More 
generally, to adopt an intentional stance towards an entity with respect to 
criminal law presupposes that the entity is capable of performing effectively in 
the type of legal obligations and prohibitions constitutive of the criminal law.
Attempts to evaluate eligibility for legal personhood traditionally approach 
the topic from one of two directions. The first direction assesses personhood 
“in terms of an essential and universal inhering nature,” which derives from 
the possession of some natural or intrinsic feature.159 Thus we see at various 
points in history courts taking seriously the legal relevance of a corporation’s
lack of hands, tongue, body, mind, or soul.160 Those days have long since 
passed by, and the intrinsic approach to evaluating personhood underlying 
                                                                                                                     
155 See generally Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations,
163 U. PA. L. REV. 95 (2014).
156 For a nice reference of different ways of describing corporations, see generally 
David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201.
157 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768–69 (2014) 
(identifying rationales for why “[t]he term ‘person’ sometimes encompasses artificial 
persons . . . and it sometimes is limited to natural persons”).
158 See Dewey, supra note 140, at 660. This is not to say that an individual’s inability 
to conform her conduct to the law thereby deprives her of her status as a legal person; 
personhood is evaluated in types, not tokens.
159 Id.
160 E.g., Bank of the U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 92 (1827) (Marshall, 
C.J., dissenting); State v. Great Works Milling & Man. Co., 20 Me. 41, 44–45 (1841); 
Bank of Ithaca v. King, 12 Wend. 390, 390–91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834); In re Sutton’s Hosp.
(1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 937, 973; 10 Co. Rep. 1 a, 32 b.
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them has mostly left, too.161 The other direction assesses personhood 
pragmatically. On this latter view, what it is “[t]o be a person is to [manifest]
the capacity to perform as a person.”162 Pragmatic accounts of personhood,
too, have a long pedigree: Dewey traces such an evaluation of legal 
personhood back to a pronouncement by Pope Innocent IV in 1246 CE,163
while List and Pettit identify similar strains in the philosophies of Thomas 
Hobbes and John Locke.164 Inasmuch as the pragmatic approach supplanted 
the intrinsic approach to personhood during the nineteenth century and has 
stayed dominant since,165 I will here forward explore pragmatically the role 
that corporate law plays in creating corporations capable of demonstrating a 
capacity to perform as a person.
2. What It Takes for an Agent to Be a Person Under the Law
Demonstrating a capacity to perform as a person requires first the ability 
to manifest intentional states and demonstrate a capacity for action. Intentional 
states consist of an attitude and a proposition towards which that attitude is 
held.166 An attitude might describe the way the world is—for example, I 
believe that the proposition “The water glass is full” is false. Alternatively, an 
attitude might describe the way an agent wants its environment to be—so, I 
might desire that “The water glass is full” be true. Meanwhile, a capacity for 
action refers specifically to an agent’s ability first to identify a divergence 
between the environment as it is and the environment as the agent wants it to 
be, and second to take suitable steps to reconcile this divergence. To wrap up 
the example, I am able to notice that “The water glass is full” is false; that I 
desire “The water glass is full” to be true; and that I can reconcile my 
diverging attitudes by walking to the sink and turning on the tap.
Although in this simple agent the core constitutive elements of criminal 
liability begin to emerge—intentional states correspond to mens rea, capacity 
for action corresponds to actus reus—simple agency is insufficient to establish 
legal personhood. It is not enough to expect merely that an agent could 
                                                                                                                     
161 Some skepticism about the possibility of corporate-criminal liability implicitly
presupposes a commitment to this anachronism, even though its rejection helped establish 
the modern corporation. See Thomas, supra note 20, at 10–11.
162 LIST & PETTIT, supra note 46, at 173. See generally Daniel Dennett, Conditions of 
Personhood, in THE IDENTITIES OF PERSONS 175 (Amélie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1976).
163 LIST & PETTIT, supra note 46, at 171; Dewey, supra note 140, at 665.
164 LIST & PETTIT, supra note 46, at 170–73.
165 See also id. at 171–78 (discussing the performative/pragmatic conception of 
personhood and adopting it in their argument). Modern statutes treat corporations as legal 
persons and regulate them as such. Such treatment assumes a pragmatic/performative 
approach to personhood, as the alternative (instrinsicist) approach included only physical 
human beings and higher intelligences. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (stating that the 
words “person” and “whoever” include corporations); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1 § 302(15) 
(2011).
166 LIST & PETTIT, supra note 46, at 21.
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respond to stimuli; we need what Tim Scanlon describes as “expectation 
grounded in a supposed responsiveness to certain reasons.”167 What is needed 
is an agent that can conform to the requirements of criminal law, and further 
can take the fact of criminality as a reason to conform its practice. More 
generally, a legal person is able to “perform effectively in the space of [legal] 
obligations”168—what Stephen Darwall refers to as “second-personal 
competence.”169 A legal person must be capable of making, and following 
through on, commitments to other persons.170 Effective performance in 
particular requires recognizing that the existence of an obligation constitutes a 
reason to act, and that failing to satisfy an obligation provides grounds for 
criticism.171 Such recognition means the agent is sensitive to criticism; it is 
capable both of recognizing failures of rationality172 and learning from past 
mistakes by taking action designed to avoid repeating irrational missteps in the 
future.173 This assumes both a capacity for second-order attitudes—that is, 
attitudes about the simple attitudes already described—and specifically some 
motivation to reform one’s conduct by imposing checks on one’s
processing.174
3. What It Takes for a Collective Agent to Be a Person Under the Law
Nothing I have said precludes the possibility of a group qualifying as a 
person; eligibility for legal personhood turns on whether an agent can reliably 
demonstrate it is appropriately “responsive to reasons,” not on whether it has a 
single or organic body.175 All the same, qualifying for legal personhood poses 
special challenges for collective agents.
Here I largely follow Margaret Gilbert’s research on collective agency and 
plural subjects, which is broadly consonant with the pragmatic approach to 
                                                                                                                     
167 SCANLON, supra note 102, at 161; accord LIST & PETTIT, supra note 46, at 178. The 
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sensitive attitudes. T.M SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 18–22 (Harvard Univ. 
Press paperback ed. 2000) (1998).
168 LIST & PETTIT, supra note 46, at 173.
169 STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT 23 (2006).
170 Id. at 59; accord LIST & PETTIT, supra note 46, at 178.
171 LIST & PETTIT, supra note 46, at 178; SCANLON, supra note 102, at 188–89.
172 List and Pettit note that “if a reasoning agent fails to be rational, then the fact that it 
self-corrects, recognizing its failure in a manner open only to a reasoning agent, will 
provide a ground for continuing to view it as an agent.” LIST & PETTIT, supra note 46, at 
31; see also DARWALL, supra note 169, at 21; Philip Pettit, Akrasia, Collective and 
Individual, in WEAKNESS OF WILL AND PRACTICAL IRRATIONALITY 68, 68 n.1 (Sarah Stroud 
& Christine Tappolet eds., 2003).
173 LIST & PETTIT, supra note 46, at 31.
174 Id. at 30.
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personhood already on display.176 For Gilbert, a plural subject consists of 
some “population of persons who are jointly committed in a certain way.”177
Individual members of a collective enter into a joint commitment to act as a 
single body. What it would mean for a plural subject to intend to X is for its 
members to act “together to constitute, as far as is possible, a single body that 
intends to” X.178 This schema extends to a host of other intentional states.179
To clarify, acting as a single body that intends X does not require that each 
member personally intends to X.180 Rather, what matters is that a member’s
“behavior generally should be expressive of the [intention], in the appropriate 
contexts.”181 For a noncorporate example, consider the U.S. Senate. The 
Senate acts and expresses attitudes through legislation and resolutions. 
Successful legislation ordinarily requires that a majority of senators 
communicate their support directly to the Senate clerk during a voting 
session.182 A Senator’s personal attitudes about legislation, to the extent that 
they differ from the support she expresses to the clerk during a voting session, 
are irrelevant in determining the Senate’s attitude towards legislation. At an 
extreme, we could imagine that no Senator privately holds an attitude that is 
nevertheless appropriately attributed to the Senate.
Acting as a body becomes more challenging in the case of a sophisticated 
plural subject—one with a large membership, a series of open-ended joint 
commitments, or both. Coordinating members in such a plural subject requires 
a complex internal structure, constituted by interlocking rules, norms, and 
customs.183 A plural subject’s internal structure may take a variety of shapes. 
It may be broadly egalitarian, it may be dictatorial, or it may be a hybrid 
consisting of interlocking hierarchies, delegations of authority, etc.184 Return 
to the Senate. The Senate’s majority voting rules create the impression of an 
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egalitarian, deliberative internal structure. But that description is overly 
simplistic of the Senate’s internal structure. The Senate limits members’
access to voting sessions through supermajority cloture requirements—sixty 
Senators must vote to open and close debate on proposed legislation185—
alongside an evolving practice about when members will contest cloture.186
Hierarchies exist in rules (e.g., legislation ordinarily cannot reach the Senate 
floor without being approved by a committee),187 norms (e.g., the Senate 
Judiciary Committee will not approve a judicial nominee before receiving a 
“blue slip” from both home-state senators),188 and culture (e.g., the practice of 
treaty, nomination, and legislation “holds”).189
A well-designed structure allows individual members to manifest and 
express collective attitudes derived from, but independent of or autonomous 
from, the personal attitudes of any particular member.190 Appreciating the 
particular structure informs the attitudes expressed. For example, Senate 
norms establish that the Senate adopts specific, intentional attitudes towards 
the meaning conveyed by legislative acts—namely, those identified by the 
markup committee and, to a weaker extent, the sponsoring member of the 
legislation.191 Likewise, a plural subject’s structure designates the contexts in 
which actions by a member should be attributed to the plural subject, as 
opposed to contexts where a member’s actions are attributable only to the 
individual.192 Thus, a Senator’s expressing an attitude outside of a voting 
session is not attributable to the Senate; otherwise, every statement by a 
Senator made at any time would constitute the official view of the Senate.
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4. Corporate Law Provides the Backbone for Corporate Personhood
As should come as no surprise, not just any group can qualify as a legal 
person. It requires a sophisticated, hierarchical, but flexible internal structure 
for a collective entity to participate effectively in the space of legal 
obligations.193 Yet commercial corporations are well-suited to clear this high 
bar. And crucially, corporate law is largely responsible for creating 
corporations sophisticated enough to qualify for personhood under the 
criminal law.
How did this happen? Corporate law plays an essential role in organizing 
corporations to adopt the type of internal deliberative structure that makes 
attributions of personhood felicitous in other contexts. In other words, 
corporate law provides corporations with the kind of sophisticated internal 
structure necessary to establish their eligibility for personhood as that legal 
concept is employed in the criminal law.
At its most basic, corporate law creates a system for individuals to come 
together to pursue a shared goal with the help of certain legal benefits—
namely, limited liability, separation of ownership and management, and an 
indefinite lifespan for an independent legal entity.194 In doing so, corporate 
law provides a framework through which those group members can organize 
their relations and interactions in order to pursue that goal. For example, 
corporate law provides preestablished classes of stakeholders that make up the 
corporation.195 It divvies up decisionmaking authority amongst classes.196 It 
specifies the scope and breadth of each class’s powers and obligations with 
respect to other stakeholders.197 On top of this, decades of judicial precedent 
have tested every aspect of these rules,198 lending to them an extra layer of 
stability and credibility for new organizations.
Corporate law in particular encourages the adoption of a structure of 
nested hierarchies—what Peter French refers to as the Corporate Internal 
Decision (CID) structure199—whose “primary function is to draw experience 
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from various levels of the corporation into a decisionmaking and ratification 
process.”200 The CID structure consolidates much of the intra-member 
deliberations within a corporation. Meanwhile, a corporation’s hierarchical 
CID structure creates both the fact and the perception of what social 
psychologists refer to as a “high entitative group” agent,201 which is “a unified 
and coherent whole in which the members are tightly bound together.”202 This 
unifying structure is bolstered by the fact that the corporation independently 
faces commercial incentives to foster its perception as a high entitative group 
and a single entity—among other things, to develop brand loyalty with 
consumers and to engender employee loyalty to the enterprise.203
It is predominantly the corporation’s hierarchical CID structure that allows 
it to be an effective participant in the space of legal obligations. Corporations 
are sufficiently well organized to express intentional attitudes and to take 
actions separate from their constitutive stakeholders. For example, 
corporations are capable of participating in the obligation-laden practice of 
contracting; corporations routinely manifest consent to enter into complicated 
contracts. And moreover, a corporation can take the fact of an obligation as 
reason to conform its conduct and can work to improve its rational 
processes.204 Indeed, List and Pettit identify conditions under which corporate 
decisionmaking may be more rational, in the sense of improving its ability to 
track the truth and learn from error, than individual decisionmaking.205 To 
continue the example, corporations demonstrate their recognition of the fact 
ratification of a contract constitutes a reason to conform corporate conduct to 
the contract’s terms; moreover, they can understand the violation of a 
contractual obligation as grounds for legal reproach. Analogously, and 
relevant for our purposes, corporations are just as capable of holding attitudes 
sufficient to satisfy mens rea, of conforming their conduct to the terms of 
criminal statutes, and of recognizing that misconduct’s status as criminally 
prohibited provides a reason to constrain corporate activity.206
Admittedly, corporate law does not require every corporation to adopt the 
same structure. Contrary to historical practice, a large portion of corporate law 
now consists of default rules that internal stakeholders may amend to suit their 
ends; corporate law does not peremptorily enforce the adoption of a single 
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internal structure applicable to every corporation.207 Nevertheless, we should 
not underestimate the profound influence that corporate law, compounded by 
market forces, has on creating corporations. Diversity in culture and 
organizational structure is real—to a point. Yet notwithstanding these caveats 
about corporate law consisting largely of jurisdiction-specific default rules, the 
effect of these corporate default rules is to produce a broadly similar type of 
commercial entity.208 These seemingly different corporate structures are built 
upon, limited by, and mediated through a core set of corporate-law rules. The 
core features of a corporation’s structure—embodied by rules about the near-
plenary power of directors, their duties of monitoring, the powers of officers, 
the total absence of employees as a part of the legal framework, etc.—pushes 
the decisionmaking process up the corporate hierarchy in a manner conducive 
to the production of autonomous corporate attitudes. Meanwhile, a structure of 
limited liability pushes the costs (and benefits) down the hierarchy and onto 
the shareholders.209
Corporate law, in other words, forms the backbone of the commercial 
corporation’s internal structure. And while what is built around that backbone 
may be understood to distinguish what sort of (legal) person a particular 
corporation will be, it is the backbone itself that satisfies the conditions of 
personhood for the purpose of criminal law. Thus, corporate law plays a 
crucial role in making possible corporate-criminal liability by designing
corporations to be the kind of things that can qualify as persons.
The upshot is that corporate law is not an entirely distinct field of law to 
be either ignored or taken for granted when discussing corporate-criminal 
liability. Far from it: Corporate law creates, or at a minimum plays a pivotal 
role in creating, the possibility of corporate persons eligible for criminal 
liability and punishment. In short, these seemingly distinct regulatory bodies 
with diametrically opposed conceptions of the corporation are in fact deeply 
intertwined with one another.210 The systems-style tinkering of corporate law 
is largely responsible for creating collective entities capable of satisfying the 
high bar of personhood for purposes of criminal responsibility.211 The Systems 
Conception of the Corporation, in this instance, creates the conditions 
necessary to license adopting the Persons Conception of the Corporation in 
other settings.
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C. Corporate Law Makes Corporate-Criminal Liability Necessary
The core of corporate law—a set of default enabling rules that provide a 
backbone structure around which to build a collective commercial enterprise—
has produced an unrivaled economic success since the early twentieth
century.212 It has created collective entities of sufficient sophistication to 
license the ascription of personhood status to them across a variety of legal 
domains, including criminal law. With respect to criminal law, it has further 
created its own need for holding corporations criminally responsible separate 
from their members; collective activity and organization is not without 
consequences, some of which I argue here that it is the purview of corporate 
law to remedy. Although there are several separate reasons to extend the 
criminal law to corporations, I will focus here only on those reasons that have 
their roots in corporate law.
Mere eligibility for personhood status, while necessary for extending the 
practice, is not necessarily sufficient for doing so. There are a host of legal 
rights and protections not afforded to corporations that are otherwise eligible 
(although that list has been shrinking in recent years).213 So what determines 
when corporations should be treated as persons? The general rough-and-ready 
rule, one articulated since the number of commercial corporations in America 
numbered in the low hundreds,214 is that “[w]hen rights, whether constitutional 
or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights 
of” individuals within the corporation.215 This sentiment is reflected in 
Brandon Garrett’s review of the personhood jurisprudence. Garrett suggests
that corporate personhood has served to vindicate the rights of individuals; 
courts extend personhood to corporations when the corporation is best suited 
to protect the rights of the shareholders.216 More broadly, it accords with the 
position that personhood status should be extended to entities only when it 
redounds to the interests of individuals within society217—a view that is 
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consonant with the extension of personhood status in federal jurisdiction,218
contract law, and tort law.219
1. Criminal Regulation as a Replacement for Corporate Law Regulation
There are several reasons, all rooted in corporate law, why the state should 
extend personhood status to corporations for the purposes of criminal liability. 
To begin, modern corporate law created a regulatory vacuum when it 
abandoned its historical role as the primary tool for regulating corporate 
activity in the marketplace, and criminal law was well positioned to fill that 
gap.
The primacy of private ordering is a hallmark of modern corporate law; 
corporate law is more an enabling system than it is one that controls, prohibits,
and regulates. This, however, is a relatively recent innovation. Until a race to 
the bottom kicked off by New Jersey, and eventually won by Delaware,220
courts and legislatures used corporate law to regulate actively, and sometimes 
aggressively, corporations’ activities.221 The regulatory posture, then, was to 
control corporations indirectly by manipulating their internal structures.222 A
dramatic abandonment of this unworkable strategy left a regulatory vacuum, 
which criminal law partially filled.223 More generally, the shift to treat 
corporations as single persons rather than systems with which to tinker 
requires a complementary system of regulation. Admittedly, while there is no 
guarantee that criminal liability would fill the void, it was nevertheless one of 
a handful of good candidates. The shift to modern corporate law, and 
particularly the elevation of a norm of private ordering, thus created a need for 
some form of regulation, which criminal law was well-situated to provide.
2. Incorporation Facilitates and Encourages Criminality
Second, corporate law enables and encourages corporations to adopt 
flexible, hierarchical structures that push information up the hierarchy and 
decisions down. However, the sort of structure that makes corporations such 
impressive vehicles of economic creation—a structure that aggregates and 
synthesizes information from lower members, pushing up anonymized 
                                                                                                                     
218 Initially, a corporation would escape federal jurisdiction if any one shareholder was 
a citizen of the same state as the opposing party. Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 
Cranch) 61, 68 (1809), overruled by Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. 
Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555 (1844) (mentioning that Chief Justice John Marshall 
came to greatly regret his opinion in Deveaux).
219 See Pollman, supra note 139, at 1633–39.
220 Avi-Yonah, supra note 214, at 802; see also Crane, supra note 137, at 12–13
(2008).
221 See supra note 134.
222 See Thomas, supra note 20, at 26–29.
223 See Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and 
an Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 393, 422 (1982); Khanna, supra note 25, at 1486.
2017] CORPORATE CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 639
information up to decisionmakers, the separation of capital and management—
enables, or at least facilitates, misconduct that would have been either less 
likely or less harmful if left to the devices of unincorporated individuals.
Incorporation brings with it a variety of well-rehearsed dangers: diffusion 
of responsibility, adoption of a group identity, in-group/out-group bias, 
bureaucratic myopia, and cognitive dissonance all conspire to make more 
likely criminal misconduct by a corporation than by individuals acting 
alone.224 And don’t forget that “agent crimes often benefit organizations and 
are committed for that reason.”225 Small wonder then that harm that can be 
wrought by corporations outstrips that done by individuals.226 These concerns 
are not new; they date back to Lord Coke’s infamous aside that corporations 
“have no souls” and arise repeatedly throughout the historical expansion of 
corporate liability.227 Moreover, they offer an explanation to observations by 
social psychologists that “[h]igh-entitativity groups are perceived to be more 
capable of engaging in negative behaviors . . . than low-entitativity groups.”228
In other words, the corporate structure has a propensity to encourage 
misconduct that individuals would be unlikely to engage in on their own.
3. Individual Criminal Liability Is Insufficient
Third, reliance on individual criminal prosecutions is an insufficient 
strategy for addressing criminal misconduct surrounding corporations. This is 
because in most cases it will be nearly impossible to ascertain which 
individual’s contributions rise to the level of criminality. This is a direct 
response to a common argument against corporate-criminal liability—viz., it is 
unnecessary to hold corporations criminally responsible because the state 
already has the authority to prosecute those individuals inside the corporation 
who are “really” responsible for the misconduct at issue.229 Now, there is a 
litany of problems with this reductionist approach to corporate responsibility. 
For one, it presumes that the mere fact of causal reducibility suffices to obviate 
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the appropriateness of moral and legal judgments in the collective context 
without explaining why the same principle fails to track individual cases. Put 
this aside. Even granting the contestable metaphysics of responsibility that 
such an argument assumes, whereby collective responsibility is exactly and 
entirely reducible to individuals’ contributions, there would still be a need to 
hold corporations criminally responsible.230 Moreover, the reason why has 
everything to do with corporate law.
To start, enforcement is plagued by epistemic obstacles that make “an easy 
reduction” from collective activity to individual contributions effectively 
impossible.231 Moreover, epistemic difficulties in the corporate context are not 
run-of-the-mill challenges present for ordinary responsibility ascriptions. 
Rather, an easy reduction is made practically impossible precisely because the 
internal structure necessary for sophisticated collective agency obscures the 
contributions of individual members.232 In other words, the same processes, 
described in Part II.B, that help to make corporations the kind of agents 
eligible for criminal liability simultaneously prevent the state from reducing 
corporate misconduct back down to the level of individuals.
Were we to depend exclusively on a practice of individual criminal 
responsibility, many culpable individuals would go unpunished.233 Worse, the 
effect of this epistemic obscurity created by corporate law is asymmetric.234 It 
is especially difficult to isolate the individual contribution of those high up in a 
hierarchical corporate structure—a phenomenon invoked to explain the lack of 
senior officials prosecuted in prominent cases of corporate misconduct.235
Individuals avoiding punishment would do so precisely because of the 
collective structure, and the collection of individuals avoiding punishment 
would skew towards those who already exercise the most control and who 
most benefit from participation in collective activity.236 The set of culpable 
individuals most likely to avoid being held responsible would also be the set of 
individuals most likely to benefit from the permission of sophisticated 
collective activity in the first place.237 This asymmetry is exacerbated by the 
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fact that a prosecutor is best positioned to convict low-level offenders both 
because their contribution to misconduct is most visible and because, in an age 
of scarce prosecutorial resources and increasingly complicated corporate 
entities, a prosecutor increasingly must rely on the cooperation of the 
corporation itself.238
To recall, the structure of the modern commercial corporation is built upon 
a foundation provided by corporate law.239 The state facilitates, through 
corporate law, institutions that are more likely to encourage criminality and 
simultaneously are designed with the effect of obscuring our ability to reduce 
collective responsibility to individual responsibility.240 It is eminently 
reasonable to conclude the state has a duty to counteract this problem. Of 
course, one solution would be to prohibit the creation of such corporate 
structures altogether. This solution throws the baby, and the rest of the family, 
out with the bathwater. A better approach for satisfying the state’s obligation 
is to hold the corporation responsible. A practice of collective punishment 
would be a valuable corrective to the peculiar epistemic obstacle attendant to 
sophisticated collective activity.241
In short, despite their distinct regulatory purposes and their diametric 
conceptions of the corporation, corporate law and criminal law are intimately 
intertwined. Corporate law creates the possibility of sophisticated collectives, 
which is an essential prerequisite for attributing personhood to corporations in 
the context of criminal law.242 In other words, corporate law’s systems-
approach towards corporate design gives rise, at least in large part, to criminal 
law’s claim to corporate personhood.243 But meanwhile, this same contribution 
from corporate law creates the need for corporate-criminal liability in the first 
place. The corporate form developed by corporate law, for all its benefits, both 
encourages or facilitates criminal activity that would not antecedently occur,
and then frustrates the criminal law’s ability to sanction such misconduct 
except through the vehicle of corporate-criminal liability.
D. Corporate Law Undermines Corporate-Criminal Fines
However, as we see in this Part, corporate law—which created both the 
possibility and the need for corporate-criminal liability—undermines the very 
punishment imposed by criminal law as a response. So the same innovation 
that creates collective entities capable of laudable accomplishments and of 
sophistication to license liability also creates a need for criminal law while 
simultaneously undermining criminal punishment.
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1. Imposing Punishment vs. Distributing Harm
I previously referred to the messy quality of punishment, whereby the 
harm attendant to punishment reliably spills over to innocent, even 
nonculpable, third parties.244 Let’s now be more precise in discussing this 
phenomenon by distinguishing the imposition of punishment from the 
distribution of harm. Recall Levinson observing this distinction in noting that 
just “[a]s in any other sanction or taxation scheme, the impact point is not 
necessarily the final resting point, or incidence, of the burden.”245 A similar 
distinction underlies Feinberg’s suggestion that harm is a socially constructed 
expression of punishment;246 we could, in theory, impose punishment without 
the harm.
With this new conceptual distinction in hand, I can put the messy, 
spillover point more precisely:
1. The imposition of punishment begets the distribution of harm.
2. The distribution of harm is often at least partially haphazard in how the 
distribution of harm occurs.
For illustration, return to our original case of the individual defendant. The 
punishment there imposed—a term of imprisonment—begets a distribution of 
harm. A large portion of that distribution is baked into the punishment itself: 
the harm is the time in prison, and that harm is not transferable (the defendant 
cannot have someone go to prison on his behalf).247 The remainder of harm, 
what I previously described as the messy, spillover quality of punishment, is 
the harm that befalls those around the defendant. We can tell a similar story 
for some collective punishments.
2. Negotiable Punishments
I belabor the point because corporate fines fall within a special class of 
punishments, ones where the division of punishment and harm is more than a 
conceptual nicety. What separates corporate fines and a handful of other 
punishments is that the distribution of harm is not, or at least need not be, 
largely predetermined by the choice of punishment. I call this class of 
punishments “Negotiable Punishments,” for reasons that will become clear 
shortly.
Negotiable Punishments have the following features. First, the punishment 
imposed is fungible and divisible; this means the process of distributing harm 
is amenable to fine-grained distributions. Second, because the distribution is 
not baked into the structure of the punishment, Negotiable Punishments 
                                                                                                                     
244 See supra Part II.C.
245 Levinson, supra note 86, at 377.
246 See Feinberg, supra note 65, at 423.
247 At least, not in our criminal justice system. See 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2012).
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introduce a consideration not available for most other punishments: who gets 
to decide the distribution. Indeed, attempts to provide a taxonomy of collective 
punishments fail, to my mind, because they focus on the ultimate distributions 
that obtain rather than on who is deciding the distribution. For example, Avia
Pasternak argues that punishment of a group can distribute in precisely three 
patterns: equally, randomly, or “in proportion to members’ differing levels of 
personal association with the collective harm.”248
Corporate-criminal fines are a paradigmatic instance of Negotiable 
Punishment as defined above—specifically, where the person being punished 
has been granted authority to determine the distribution of harm from its own 
punishment.249 Instead, the state imposes a fine on a criminal corporation and 
leaves it to the private negotiations of the corporations’ members how to divvy 
up the harm. From the perspective of the criminal law, it does not matter who 
within the organization is ultimately responsible for covering the incidence of 
the fine; the state’s only interest qua enforcer of punishment is that the entirety 
of the fine is paid.250 Whether stakeholders distribute the harm randomly, 
equally, proportional to some assessment of culpability, etc., is outside the 
interest of the state. It is this dynamic that leads me to describe fines as 
Negotiable Punishment—unlike most punishments, the distribution of harm 
can be assigned according to an agreement reached by the private negotiations 
of corporate members.
3. The Role of Corporate Law in Undermining Criminal Fines
The idea of turning the distribution of harm over to the private 
negotiations of stakeholders is in some ways a fitting approach for the criminal 
law to take. Among other things, it avoids the sort of looking-past concerns 
raised earlier, where the criminal law treats the corporations as a single person 
separate from its constitutive individuals at the moment of conviction only to 
abandon the person conception of the corporation in order to target individuals 
who are “really” responsible for the misconduct.251 However, it is also the 
source of fines’ failure as punishment.
Start with the idea that the distribution of fines is turned over, by the 
criminal law, to the private negotiations of members. The structured 
relationship of individuals within a corporation falls well within the purview 
of corporate law; recall that corporate law enables individuals to pursue 
                                                                                                                     
248 Pasternak, supra note 98, at 220.
249 Of course, it is conceivable that the State imposes a corporate fine and then further 
specifies which stakeholders will foot the bill. However, this is not the world we have; the 
status quo manifestly eschews such an approach.
250 This is evidenced, among other things, by the fact that the Sentencing Guidelines 
do not consider the issue, despite devoting a plurality of Chapter 8 to the calculation of 
corporate-criminal fines. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
251 See supra Part III.A.
644 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:3
collective, usually commercial, activity under the guise of a single corporate 
entity and further provides default rules that strongly influence the ways in 
which individuals relate to each other, especially in terms of rights, powers, 
and responsibilities within the corporation.252 Put another way, the imposition 
of corporate-criminal fines is solidly the province of criminal law, whereas the 
distribution of harm from those fines is solidly the province of corporate law. 
And, as it turns out, corporate law has settled the distributive question in a 
manner that leads fines to fail as punishment for all the reasons identified in 
Part II.
Return to the idea that negotiated punishments are so called because they
allow stakeholders to negotiate amongst themselves how to distribute the harm 
attendant to punishment. But negotiations do not occur in a vacuum. How 
group members decide to distribute harm is inseparable from—indeed, is all 
but determined by—the deliberative structure through which members 
interact. The outcome agreed upon by members within a broadly egalitarian 
structure—citizens in a political caucus, for example, or partners in a 
partnership—are likely to be quite different from the outcome “negotiated”
within a rigidly hierarchical structure in which large swaths of decisionmaking 
authority are reserved to a concentrated class of individuals.253
As Part II demonstrated, commercial corporations have just such 
hierarchical structures. Moreover, the state plays a pivotal role in producing 
corporations that consolidate and compartmentalize decisionmaking. The state 
is ultimately responsible for creating, or at least permitting and endorsing 
entities with hierarchical structures. In particular, corporate law provides 
shareholders precious few direct legal tools to negotiate the distribution of 
harm with officers and directors.254 Employees have even less recourse. 
Instead, and as a result, corporate punishments are distributed through and out 
of a corporation as if they are any other cost borne by the corporation. Thus, 
although members could agree to adopt a different distribution—the state 
would not turn down a payment of a fine if, for example, officers had agreed 
to forgo their salaries to cover the cost—the status quo of corporate law 
virtually guarantees that deviations from the current setup will not occur.255
Indeed, plausibly the only opportunity for negotiation surrounding the 
distribution of corporate-criminal fines occurs at the moment the corporation’s
                                                                                                                     
252 See supra Part III.B.4.
253 See supra notes 171–72, 209–12 and accompanying text.
254 E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV.
675, 688 (2007); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 311 (1999). Indeed, this point is further complicated 
to the extent that it presumes “shareholders” share uniform preferences. That presumption 
is under particular strain with respect to diverging interests between large, controlling 
shareholders and their smaller counterparts. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 787–803 (2003).
255 Bebchuk, supra note 254, at 688–703 (detailing reasons why shareholders are ill-
equipped to meaningfully threaten bargaining positions held by a board of directors).
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would-be founders are trying to decide whether to incorporate or to adopt 
instead a different commercial vehicle. After that, the mere decision to 
incorporate by itself all but guarantees the outcome of future distributions.
Thus, while it may be true that, in a formal sense, the distribution of a fine 
reflects the settled negotiations of the corporation’s members, in reality the 
notion that distributions are actually negotiated is a farce.256 As we’ve seen, 
the distribution of a corporate fine is, as it turns out, highly predictable: when 
it comes to corporate fines, “shareholders pay the fines.”257 This mismatch 
between the formal description of corporate fines as Negotiable Punishments 
and the reality of corporate fines falling upon shareholders is directly 
attributable to corporate law.
We can see now the crux of the problem that motivated this discussion in 
the first place. The state entrusts the distribution of harm to the private 
negotiations of corporate members, but only after creating corporate structures 
that virtually guarantee those negotiations will result in harm being pushed 
away from those in a position to control corporate misconduct and onto 
shareholders and employees.258 Put simply, the state’s blind eye towards the 
influence of corporate law means that it sabotages its own attempt to punish 
corporations with criminal fines.
IV. CAN AND SHOULD CORPORATE LAW IMPROVE CRIMINAL FINES?
A. Can Corporate Law Reform Improve Criminal Punishment?
What would it mean to improve the failure of corporate-criminal fines by 
means of corporate-law reform? Here I sketch such a proposal, which broadly 
consists of two parts: (1) Shift the default distribution of harm attendant to 
criminal punishment away from shareholders and onto a separate class of 
stakeholders, and (2) Build into the corporate structure clear pathways through 
which to negotiate a final distribution of harm, one that improves the extent to 
which corporate fines satisfy traditional rationales of punishment. Specifically, 
I suggest holding directors personally liable for paying the cost of a corporate 
fine, and establishing a Corporate-Crime Clawback bylaw designed to allow 
directors to decrease their personal exposure with funds clawed back from 
other stakeholders. Consider each element in turn.
1. Director Liability for Corporate-Criminal Fines
To begin, I advocate making the directorship liable for the entire cost of a 
corporate-criminal fine.259 Specifically, directors would be held jointly and
                                                                                                                     
256 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 88, at 1367.
257 Id.
258 See supra Part III.D.
259 I suggest ways to relax this requirement in the Objections section, see infra 
Part IV.A.3, but start with the strong version of the proposal for clarity.
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severally responsible, with rights of contribution, for absorbing the harm 
attendant to the imposition of a fine.260
No doubt this would represent a major break from the current distribution 
of rights and responsibilities among corporate stakeholders.261 On the other 
hand, corporate law has a long tradition of modifying the personal exposure of 
stakeholders, and of shifting the distribution of harms among classes of 
stakeholders. For example, jurisdictions around the turn of the twentieth
century provided statutory protection for employees from corporate harms that 
have since been removed.262 Courts further developed doctrines that 
constrained shareholder limited liability to provide some protection for third 
parties in the case of insolvency.263 Indeed, as late as 1930, several 
jurisdictions still denied shareholders the full protection of limited personal 
liability we’ve come to expect of modern corporations.264 Corporate law 
remains in flux in the modern era, even specifically with respect to questions 
about the proper distribution of harm amongst members. In the mid-1980s 
Delaware altered the corporate structure when it permitted a corporation, 
through its bylaws, to limit or eliminate entirely directors’ personal liability for 
violations of their duty of care.265 Recently, the 2010s saw debate over 
whether to permit “loser-pay” bylaw provisions, which would make 
shareholders who bring a derivative suit, rather than the corporation, pay the 
litigation costs of a failed suit.266
In what ways does direct liability improve the shortcomings of criminal 
fines as a form of corporate punishment? For one thing, shifting the default 
distribution of harm goes some way towards ameliorating the cost-of-doing 
business problem that undercuts the expressive value of corporate punishment. 
Recall that the state’s expression of communal condemnation is undermined 
when the punishment expressing and bolstering that condemnation is virtually 
                                                                                                                     
260 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 10 (AM.
LAW INST. 2000).
261 See supra Part III.D.3.
262 Mass. Pub. Stat. ch. 106, § 61 (1882); N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 57 (Consol. 1909).
263 See Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 610, 620 (1873) (establishing the Trust 
Fund Doctrine). For a discussion of the various causes behind the decline of the Trust Fund 
Doctrine, see Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate 
Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 207–14 (1985).
264 See Act of Feb. 17, 1848, ch. 40, 1848 N.Y. Laws 54; Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 
288 U.S. 517, 550–54 & nn.5–26 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Some held shareholders 
liable for twice their capital contribution. See Horwitz, supra note 263, at 208 (describing 
New York’s double-liability provision as “[t]he most typical provision”).
265 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). See generally Thomas C. Lee,
Comment, Limiting Corporate Directors’ Liability: Delaware’s Section 102(b)(7) and the 
Erosion of the Directors’ Duty of Care, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 239 (1987).
266 C. Steven Bradford, The Death of Loser-Pays in Delaware, BUS. L. PROF BLOG
(June 15, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2015/06/the-death-of-
loser-pays-in-delaware.html [https://perma.cc/6ELD-U5ZX] (discussing the continued 
viability of ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014)).
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indistinguishable from any and all other types of corporate harm.267 No longer. 
By resting responsibility to pay the harm from a corporate fine on directors, 
corporate-criminal fines stand distinct from all other forms of corporate harm.
With respect to deterrence, directors are better positioned than 
shareholders to detect and prevent criminal misconduct.268 By contrast, under 
the status quo shareholders have at best weak mechanisms to influence 
director activity.269 By having the distribution fall directly on directors, there 
is some degree to which the deterrent effect of fines improves. That said, 
shifting the distribution of harm to directors is an incomplete step towards
improving deterrence. To be sure, “[c]ollective sanctions . . . have the potential 
to leverage group solidarity by substituting more efficient intra-group 
monitoring and control mechanisms for less efficient externally imposed 
sanctions aimed at individual wrongdoers.”270 Directors have a great deal of 
de jure authority in the corporate structure;271 they also would now have a 
strong incentive to shift the harm attendant to corporate punishment onto other
stakeholders however possible.
However, shifting onto directors the distribution of harm attendant to 
corporate punishment goes only so far in improving the deterrence value of 
corporate fines. Directors’ current powers to monitor and appoint officers are 
likely not sufficiently fine-grained to achieve the sorts of efficient deterrence 
imagined in the quotation above; directors are not immune from the same 
epistemic concerns plaguing regulators, even if they are still in a better 
position to avoid them.272 Absent clear mechanisms to facilitate negotiations 
over the ultimate distribution of harm, directors’ incentives will not 
necessarily align with the state’s interest in improving the deterrent effect of 
fines. The second component of reforms addresses directly this shortcoming.
2. The Corporate-Crime Clawback Bylaw
We have already seen that negotiations over the ultimate distribution of 
harm attendant to a corporate fine are largely influenced by the extent to which 
a corporation’s internal structure provides meaningful avenues of negotiations 
among suitably situated participants to such negotiations. Shifting the 
distribution of harm away from shareholders onto directors does something to 
improve the cost-of-doing business problem. Improving deterrence for fines 
requires that we establish clear pathways and mechanisms that empower 
                                                                                                                     
267 See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
268 See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (discussing directors’ duty to monitor); accord Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 
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269 See supra Part III.D.3.
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271 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011).
272 See supra notes 230–32 and accompanying text.
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directors to diminish their newfound share of the harm in a manner that 
improves the extent to which criminal fines improve corporate deterrence.
To achieve this goal, the second part of my proposal is to allow 
corporations to adopt into their bylaws a modified form of incentive-based 
clawback provisions—what I call a Corporate-Crime Clawback—that shifts 
the harm attendant to corporate punishment from directors onto officers and 
high-value employees.
The special characteristics of the Corporate-Crime Clawback provision 
find their roots in the recent trend not just towards having executive clawback 
provisions but specifically towards building them into a corporation’s
structure. In its basic form, a clawback provision is a term, included either in 
an employment contract or in the corporation’s compensation policies, that 
allows the employer to recoup previously paid out incentive compensation—
bonuses, stock options, etc., but not earned income—under prenegotiated 
circumstances.273 An ordinary clawback provision thus straightforwardly 
redistributes costs away from shareholders and towards officers.274
Since 2002, federal securities regulators have leveraged their near-plenary, 
albeit indirect, control over access to major capital markets to increase the 
prevalence of clawback provisions.275 First the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX) empowers the SEC, as opposed to the corporation itself, to claw back 
incentive payments to the CEO and CFO of a publically traded company after 
“an accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as 
a result of misconduct.”276 Second, the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP), expanded the targets of clawback provisions to high-ranking 
individuals in addition to the CEO and CFO.277 Unlike SOX, TARP required 
                                                                                                                     
273 One paradigmatic circumstance: an employee commits fraud against or on behalf of 
the corporation. Clawback provisions are also beginning to be used as a form of 
noncompete clause. See, e.g., AM. EXPRESS, PROXY STATEMENT FOR 2012 ANNUAL
MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS 37–38 (2012), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/4962
/000119312512121814/d302637ddefc14a.htm#toc302637_25 [https://perma.cc/9RJW-
X5AB] (identifying “working for certain competitors” as an instance of “[d]etrimental 
conduct” triggering the clawing back of compensation).
274 Id.
275 As a result, clawback provisions have exploded in prevalence; whereas fewer than 
20% of Fortune 100 companies had such provisions as recently as 2006, today that number 
is close to 90%. EQUILAR, 2013 CLAWBACK POLICY REPORT 5 (2013).
276 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (2012). Notably, the misconduct at issue need not have 
actually been carried out by the CEO or the CFO; misconduct by any employee suffices to 
ground an action by the SEC provided the misconduct led to material noncompliance. Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1075–76 (D. Ariz. 2010); accord Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n v. Microtune, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 867, 886 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (holding 
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scienter or misconduct on behalf of the officers in order to trigger reimbursement”), aff’d
sub nom. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Bartek, 484 F. App’x 949 (5th Cir. 2012).
277 12 U.S.C. § 5221(b)(3) (2012) (covering “senior executive officer[s] and any of the 
next 20 most highly-compensated employees”). TARP came under the Emergency 
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directors to develop clawback provisions on their own for their respective 
corporations.278 Third, Congress in 2010 passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act279 (Dodd–Frank) to, inter alia, allow for 
the clawback of incentive payments because of “an accounting restatement due 
to the material noncompliance of the issuer.”280 Dodd–Frank diverges from 
SOX and TARP in that it incentivizes, but does not require, corporations to 
develop their own clawback policies, through corporate bylaws, implementing 
the goals outlined in § 78j-4(b) and subsequent regulations.281 Thus, Dodd–
Frank influences the corporate structure, creating a clawback provision that 
directors may enforce to recoup incentive payments.282
The Corporate-Crime Clawback builds upon these recent developments. 
First, like TARP and Dodd–Frank, the provision would reach past the CEO 
and CFO to include any employee receiving incentive payments. Second, the 
provision would not be included in bespoke employment contracts; the 
corporate bylaws would be required to specify the conditions under which an 
officer could have incentive payments clawed back in the event of a corporate 
conviction. Ideally, a corporation would be allowed to so amend its bylaws 
only if it further included in the new bylaws procedural protections for the 
exercise of the Corporate-Crime Clawback against an employee.
That said, the Corporate-Crime Clawback would differ in two important 
respects. First, its usage would be limited to instances involving a corporate-
criminal conviction. Second the money recouped through clawbacks would 
directly diminish the directorship’s liability; every dollar recovered would be
one less dollar for directors to pay. The effect of the Corporate-Crime 
Clawback bylaw would be to empower directors to distribute harm to those 
more likely to have carried out, or more directly in a position to have 
prevented, corporate crime. And unlike other clawback provisions, directors 
would have strong personal incentive to utilize the pathways for distributing 
the harm attendant to a corporate-criminal fine.
                                                                                                                     
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 101–136, 122 Stat. 
3765, 3767–800 (2008) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211–5241).
278 See 12 U.S.C. § 5221(b)(3) (detailing conditions a clawback provision must 
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279 See generally Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641).
280 Unlike SOX, Dodd–Frank does not require that the misreporting be the result of 
misconduct. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4(b).
281 It does so by prohibiting noncomplying corporations access to national securities 
exchanges. Id. § 78j-4(a). So, “incentivize” might understate it. 
282 Dodd–Frank’s rules concerning clawback provisions have not yet been set by 
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3. Anticipating Objections
No policy proposal survives contact with the real world. That said, on the 
account provided here, I can venture answers to a few key questions and 
respond to a few probable objections.
Directors would scapegoat hapless employees. Ideally, under my proposal 
directors would seek in good faith to identify culpable individuals inside the 
corporation: those who personally contributed to the sanctionable 
misconduct—for example, by carrying out the misconduct, authorizing it, or 
creating conditions that cannot be satisfied without resort to criminality—or 
who stood in a position to prevent it but failed to do so. This would discourage 
future misconduct by distributing harm proportionally to contributors of 
corporate crime in a manner that criminal law is both epistemically and 
conceptually unable to do. Likewise, directors would avoid distributing harm 
to those for whom paying the cost of corporate crime would serve no deterrent 
value. However, insofar as directors benefit personally each time they find a 
culpable individual, there is a strong temptation to pay short shrift to the latter 
goal.
To reiterate, under my proposal adoption of the Corporate-Crime 
Clawback bylaw would require articulating the conditions and protections 
guiding its usage. Any bylaw should prioritize creating a fair process through 
which directors may exercise their powers to use the Corporate-Crime 
Clawback. We can look to administrative law for guidance on what constitutes 
fair process; modifying Mathews v. Eldridge to the current setting would mean 
balancing the weight of the interest of the corporation in identifying culpable 
individuals, the weight of the interest in individuals not being wrongly found 
culpable, and the marginal benefit gained from additional process.283 I favor 
strong procedural rights—in particular, the use of third-party investigations 
and neutral tribunals284—for several reasons. First, individuals have much to 
lose from the Corporate-Crime Clawback. Analogizing to SOX, the few SEC 
enforcement cases that have occurred frequently clawed back millions of 
dollars in incentive compensation—one case clawed back a staggering $468
million from a single individual.285 Second, directors have conflicting interests 
insofar as they have close working relationships with corporate executives;
indeed, while directors have de jure authority in the corporation, it is well 
settled that corporate executives have de facto authority.286 Accordingly, while 
                                                                                                                     
283 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Matthews establishes the three-part 
modern doctrine for assessing how much process is due. See id. 
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some processes may be too onerous to make the Corporate-Crime Clawback
feasible, the burden should fall to directors to make this case.
More importantly, and process aside, I want to note two things in defense 
of my proposal with respect to scapegoating. By design at least two classes of 
stakeholders are immune to scapegoating: shareholders and low-level 
employees. Shareholders cannot have costs passed to them because they are 
not compensated by incentives (they are owners). Likewise, low-level 
employees are effectively immune from scapegoating: either they do not 
receive incentives, or any incentives they do receive are small enough to not 
be worth the effort to recover. And, it just so happens that these same classes 
of stakeholders are those who lack negotiating leverage when it comes to the 
distribution of harm. One effect of my proposal, then, is to inure from harm 
those stakeholders least able to protect themselves from the outcome of 
negotiations.
Second, although we should worry about scapegoating, it would be naïve 
to pretend that it does not already occur in the context of corporate 
punishment. Consider Siemens, a corporation guilty of paying out $1 billion 
through a global bribery scheme the existence of which insiders described as 
“common knowledge” inside the firm.287 Although Siemens pleaded guilty, its 
punishment was greatly reduced for its “‘outstanding’ help” in developing 
cases against middle managers at the corporation.288 Meanwhile, Garrett 
reports that as anticipated, “individual low-level employees . . . would get 
prosecuted as scapegoats while those at the top would go free.”289 At least 
under my proposal, the scapegoating might lead to financial disgorgement 
rather than imprisonment—a small consolation, but a consolation nonetheless.
In short, there is cautious room for optimism that adequate process could 
help to produce proportional distributions, bolstered by the low bar set by the 
status quo.
Executives will neuter the policy by insisting on higher salaries instead of 
incentive-based payments. Likely they will try; indeed, there is already some 
evidence to suggest that they are already doing so in response to federal 
regulations creating new clawback provisions.290
However, it is important to remember why employment contracts have 
incentive payments in the first place—to align agent-employee’s personal 
interests with the principal-corporation’s interests.291 That is, incentive-based 
payments ceteris paribus are not in the personal interests of employees if the 
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same compensation could be obtained in the form of a salary.292 Directors are 
not likely to abandon entirely this well-settled mechanism merely because 
officers now dislike them more.
Indeed, my proposal has an advantage over other clawback provisions. In 
the ordinary case, directors insisting on incentive-based payment are acting 
merely in their legal capacity to serve the interest of the corporation.293 Under 
my proposal, directors now have a further personal financial interest to include 
incentive payments in contracts, particularly for the sorts of employees 
positioned to participate in, or otherwise produce corporate misconduct. 
Accordingly, I expect that officer pushback will be met with stiffer resistance 
under my proposal than under the evolving status quo.
The magnitude of corporate-criminal fines makes my proposal infeasible. 
Two responses to this point. Admittedly, it is the rare board of directors that 
can personally afford $1 billion in fines. However, recall that most fines are 
significantly more modest: the median fine over the past fifteen years is 
$125,000, while the average fine is $7 million.294 More to the point, under my 
proposal we would not need gigantic fines; as we have seen they are an 
unsuccessful solution to a problem of deterrence that my policy solves in a 
different way. Under my proposal, smaller fines could nevertheless 
accomplish the desired effect. Indeed, per Guttel and Teichman, smaller fines 
may have the ancillary benefit of increasing the number of prosecutions.295
This is not to say that large financial penalties need go away; large restitution 
payments, an entirely separate topic from fines (and not a form of 
punishment),296 may well serve social value.297
Second, there are other ways to maintain the logic of my proposal while 
accommodating worries about overburdening directors. One method would be 
to cap director’s personal liability—say to their actual compensation or some 
multiple of it, as was once done with limited liability.298 Directors could be 
personally responsible for only a portion—either a percentage or an absolute 
amount—of the total fine. I am not in a position to announce the best 
implementation strategy, but I trust that sentencing courts could develop best 
practices. Already Chapter Eight of the Sentencing Guidelines, identifies a 
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bevy of considerations that would be instructive for guiding sentencing 
practices on this issue.299
Directors will seek insurance to indemnify themselves against personal 
liability. The presence of insurance does not undermine the efficacy of my 
proposal. This is because insurers will have the same incentives as directors to 
defray costs by clawing back payments from executives. Indeed, insurers may 
be more likely to claw back payments, because they are not subject to the 
same working relationship that exists between directors and executives that 
may otherwise complicate a director’s incentives.
More fundamentally, the insurance critique would matter if it were the 
case that directors were being made to pay on the basis of their personal 
culpability. If that were the case, then insurance would seem a form of 
shirking their due punishment. But, the motivation behind the Corporate-
Crime Clawback is to alter intracorporate negotiations so as to ensure that 
criminal fines better serve their penological objections; director culpability 
does not enter into the issue, as the next Part shows.
B. Corporate-Law Reform, or Just More Criminal Punishment?
The major criticism, hinted at in discussing director insurance, brings our 
discussion full circle back to the question of what it means for corporate 
punishment to be considered a failure. An intuitive reaction to my proposal is 
that it punishes those at the top of the structure for the sins of the corporation; 
revisiting Alschuler, I have done nothing to change the fact that corporate 
punishment “punishes the innocent along with the guilty.”300 If accurate, I 
would be advocating violating the Persons Conception of the Corporation—
convict the corporation, then look past the corporation to punish those “really”
responsible—in precisely the manner that I have described repeatedly as 
undermining the conceptual basis for corporate-criminal liability. To add insult 
to injury, I would have embraced the stereotype that officers are directors and 
officers are always exclusively responsible for corporate crime,301 despite the 
sensible observation from Gilbert: “What does the blameworthiness of the 
collective’s act imply about the personal blameworthiness of any one member 
of that collective? From a logical point of view, the short answer is: 
nothing.”302
Such a criticism, however, misunderstands my proposal, and in doing so,
elides the role that corporate law plays in influencing criminal punishment. It 
relies on the same category error anticipated in Part II.C: selectively import 
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notions of guilt and innocence from criminal law into the exclusive purview of 
corporate law—viz., into a discussion of organizational design with the goal of 
achieving effective distribution of benefits and burdens among group 
members. As such, this critique merely begs the question against my proposal.
My proposal does nothing to disrupt the current practice of criminal law: a 
corporation is still prosecuted as a single person, and if convicted the 
corporation—not any of its individual stakeholders—is still punished with a 
fine. The inevitable byproduct of punishment is a distribution of harm to third 
parties.303 In the case of corporate-criminal fines, it just so happens that the 
standard punishment for corporations leaves to stakeholders how to distribute 
this third-party harm.304
The corporate structure present in the status quo virtually guarantees a 
distribution that has the effect of undermining the deterrent and expressive 
values of corporate-criminal fines.305 The idea behind my proposed Corporate-
Crime Clawback is to embed into the corporate structure a different 
negotiating playing field. This playing field, applicable only in the criminal 
context, is likely to affect the distribution of harm in a manner that realizes, or 
at least improves satisfaction of, the underlying penological objections 
currently receiving short shrift.
Questions of guilt and innocence are wholly orthogonal to the question of 
the preferred distribution of harm attendant to corporate punishment. Just as 
before, the criminal law is not looking past the convicted corporation to harm 
those “really” responsible for the underlying misconduct. On the account 
provided, whether directors or officers are culpable for the underlying 
corporate misconduct has no bearing on the recommendation that corporate 
fines be paid by the directorship with rights of contribution via clawback 
against officers and high managerial agents. Granted, it may bear out 
empirically—though certainly not in all cases—the directors and officers are 
in fact more responsible than other stakeholders.306 If that responsibility rises 
to the level of criminal conduct, by all means prosecute the individual 
separately alongside the corporation. But culpability of directors and officers 
is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain or justify the reforms proposed. In 
short, to criticize the Corporate-Crime Clawback on the basis that it imposes 
harm on ostensibly innocent third parties—a practice corporate punishment 
does now, just on different innocent third parties—is to criticize corporate 
punishment for failing a standard that virtually no punishment of any kind 
could satisfy.
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Even one who accepts the conceptual distinction might be suspicious of 
my proposal. After all, my policy interferes with the private negotiations of 
corporate stakeholders, effectively forcing stakeholders to adopt a new 
structure whose negotiations just so happen to target officers and directors—
individuals who, by my own admission, may be antecedently more likely to 
bear personal culpability for corporate misconduct and who regardless are the 
frequent target of popular ire. Does the Corporate-Crime Clawback force 
corporations to adopt a distribution that stakeholders would not have 
negotiated on their own? And if so, isn’t my proposal just a roundabout way of 
targeting officers and directors in contravention to the Persons Conception of 
Corporations essential to corporate-criminal liability and punishment?
In a word, no. This line of criticism gets its purchase by smuggling into 
my proposal the very background corporate-law conditions whose preservation 
are under dispute. Allowing shareholders to bear the harm attendant to a 
criminal fine is neither a necessary feature of corporate law nor the agreed 
upon outcome simpliciter. Rather, it is a default outcome in light of 
background corporate-law rules that empower management to shift the cost of 
a corporate-criminal fine to shareholders.307 Shifting the distribution of harm 
to directors or officers is problematic against this status quo backdrop of 
corporate law because it involves the state settling matters of internal 
negotiation on behalf of corporate members after acting in a manner 
suggestive that it would instead interface with the corporation.308 But this 
criticism would fall flat if raised in a corporate-law regime that encourages 
structures where fines fall to directors and officers. For such a regime, the state 
would not settle matters of internal negotiations on behalf of corporate 
stakeholders; the corporation would be punished, and the distribution of fines 
could come out differently. Indeed, under such a background of corporate law, 
directors would be the ones who experienced harm by default; directing fines 
to shareholders in such a world would be like impermissibly looking past the 
corporate person to target individuals.
Corporate law is interested, among other things, in determining the right 
distributions among stakeholders of benefits and burdens, of rights and 
responsibilities. Under the status quo, that manifests as a predictable division 
of powers, rights, and responsibilities, alongside a hierarchical structure 
establishing the relationship between these differently empowered classes, the 
effect of which is to produce predictable distributions of harm.309 Yet 
precisely under discussion is whether the status quo of corporate law serves 
the state’s broader interests with respect to the regulation of corporate activity. 
Under dispute is which corporate law rule produces structures whose 
distributions best serve the state’s interest in regulating corporations through 
criminal law. But the critic can get traction here only be presupposing the 
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current setup of corporate law. Put succinctly, criticisms that my proposal for 
the Corporate-Crime Clawback punishes individuals simply beg the question.
C. Should Corporate Law Improve Criminal Punishment?
The specific policy at issue—pairing director liability with the Corporate-
Crime Clawback bylaw—provides an opportunity to reflect generally on the 
intimate connections between corporate law and criminal law, and the ways in 
which reforms to one legal domain might improve the other. In this final Part,
I want to step back from specific policy reforms to address more generally the 
underlying soundness of using corporate law to improve criminal punishment.
Corporate law has created an internal structure that is ill-suited for 
criminal fines. Criminal law’s commitment to the Persons Conception of the 
Corporation means that the state must turn the distribution of harm over to the 
private negotiations of stakeholders.310 However, the internal structure 
provided by corporate law—the very structure responsible for making 
corporate-criminal liability both possible and necessary—has the further effect 
of rendering farcical any meaningful sense of negotiation over the distribution 
of harm attendant to a criminal fine.311 Harm is distributed reliably away from 
those stakeholders who exercise control over the corporation onto shareholders 
with virtually no bargaining leverage.312
This distributive outcome is the source of corporate-criminal fines’ failure 
as punishment. It undermines deterrence. It reinforces the perception that fines
are simply the cost of doing business. A different distribution could improve 
corporate-criminal fines, and that means incentivizing a different outcome 
from negotiations, one that pushes the harm towards those in control of the 
corporation in a manner that distinguishes criminal fines from the cost of 
doing business. Because criminal law is hamstrung on the front—its object of 
regulation is the corporate person, not the stakeholders behind the corporate 
person313—and because the outcome of negotiations is largely influenced by 
the internal structure that mediate negotiations, fixing corporate fines means 
amending corporate law to improve the distribution of criminal fines. 
Accordingly, on this argument, to fix criminal fines we need to reform 
corporate law.
Thus arises the obvious next question: should we reform corporate law? 
Or more specifically: Given the state’s commitment to holding corporations 
criminally responsible, is fixing (or improving) the failure of corporate-
criminal fines reason enough to consider reforming the underlying corporate 
structure enabled by corporate law?
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I believe it is. There is a tendency, at least among criminal-law scholars, to 
treat corporate law as a fixed commodity, and the internal structure of a 
corporation as an unchangeable feature of the world. But this treatment belies 
reality. Corporate law is not an immutable fixture of the legal landscape; I 
have already described several examples of dramatic changes to corporate law 
that left the corporation unrecognizable from its previous form.314 From a 
more global perspective, legal historians identify no fewer than three epochal 
shifts in the role of corporate law and the nature of the commercial corporation 
in the nineteenth century alone.315 Major changes to corporate law pushed on 
through the twentieth century and continue today; features we now assume are 
constitutive features of a corporation were contested well into the twentieth
century.316 Put starkly: There is no, and has never been, a natural corporate 
law.
Of course, the fact that corporate law can and does change does not put the 
entire enterprise up for grabs. Nevertheless, there are several reasons not to 
shy away from using corporate law to improve the failure of corporate-
criminal fines.
1. Corporate Reform Solves a Problem Created by Corporate Law
The turn to corporate-law reform is not an ad hoc attempt to solve a 
criminal-law problem. Quite the contrary, I am advocating that we use 
corporate-law reform in order to solve a problem created by corporate law.
The current state of corporate law inescapably impacts a corporation’s
structure in ways that, at least as far as criminal law is concerned, are deeply 
problematic. The motivation, then, is to get corporate law out of the way of the 
state’s objective to hold corporations criminally responsible. This is 
particularly important because, as discussed previously, the state has 
repeatedly chosen to use a tort/crime model of regulation over a corporate-law 
model of regulation.317 This seems good reason to prevent corporate law from 
sabotaging its regulatory replacement.
One might imagine a complaint against my proposal, or against corporate-
law reform more broadly, that such reforms privatize the role of criminal 
punishment by relying on corporate law for its implementation. That is, the 
state convicts and decides the appropriate punishment, but then—particularly 
with corporate fines—deputizes the corporation to carry out its own 
punishment in a manner broadly subject to the corporation’s discretion.
But this point overlooks the fact that justice is already being outsourced—
that is the central insight to be gleaned from recognizing corporate fines as 
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Negotiable Punishments. I am not advocating handing over penal authority to 
corporations; I am advocating that the state take seriously the decision it has 
already made to hand over this authority. If the state is going to hold 
corporations criminally responsible, it further has reason to insist on 
distributions of harm that work to the benefit both of the state and of 
nonculpable individuals.
2. Corporate-Law Reform Is Limited to Criminal Punishment
Any sensible reform will or should focus on affecting the distribution of 
criminal fines. Granted, any reform has the potential to produce spillover 
consequences. That said, I intend to advocate reforms that are tied to a 
corporate conviction; I don’t advocate altering anything about the corporate 
structure except for how it is to respond to the distribution of harm associated 
with criminal punishment.
To date, corporate law has done nothing to distinguish the distribution of 
criminal fines from other harms.318 That may have something to do with the 
fact that the features of the modern corporation took root just before corporate-
criminal liability attained widespread recognition.319 Alternatively, it may 
simply be an issue overlooked in part because the practice received so little 
attention from courts until late into the twentieth century; for example, the 
underlying doctrine of corporate-criminal liability has not been revised since 
the Supreme Court’s first opinion on the topic in New York Central.320 Nor 
were the roots of modern corporate law necessarily the product of incremental 
reform developed across state, federal, and international jurisdictions. 
Consider Justice Brandeis’s description of the harried birth of the modern 
corporation—a “race . . . not of diligence but of laxity”—that produced “the 
Frankenstein monster which States have created by their corporation laws.”321
There is nothing to preclude different structural responses to criminal 
consequences than other harms, nor is there any indication that the idea of 
such a division has been vetted.
3. Corporate Law Should Not Accept Its Complicity for the Status Quo
Finally, if the account provided here is accurate, then nonaction by the 
state implies its acceptance of a status quo that permits, and often encourages, 
corporations to treat criminality as a business plan. This means forcing 
prospective shareholders to gamble on a corporation’s predilection for
criminal behavior. And even if shareholders were willing to take such a risk, it 
is a further question whether the state should endorse a society that expects its 
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citizens to gamble on the prospect of criminal activity the same as they would 
a bad PR strategy or poor product rollout. In this respect, I agree with Mueller 
that the state should not “add a [criminal law] gamble to the economic gamble 
which already inheres in most, if not all, stock market ventures.”322
Fundamentally, this tolerance renders a mockery of what the criminal law 
is supposed to represent. In what sense is the state expressing our communal 
condemnation of egregious wrongdoing by expecting market participants to 
accept the commission of crime as a cost of participation? The same worry 
extends to corporate law. The status quo betrays the absolute minimum 
limitation on corporations—the only remnant of the centuries-old belief that 
incorporation should serve some form of public benefit—which today exists in 
nearly all corporation’s articles of incorporation: the corporation must confine 
its activities to “any lawful act.”323 If corporate law contributes significantly to 
this dysfunction, it behooves us at least to explore reform.
V. CONCLUSION
It has been over 100 years since the Supreme Court first blessed the 
practice of holding a corporation criminally responsible separate from its 
individual members.324 But tradition is not reason enough to continue a 
practice that has proven steadfastly ineffective. If the federal government is 
committed to using the criminal law to hold corporations responsible, it should 
consider that corporate-law reforms are a promising, albeit underexplored, 
method for improving the current sad state of corporate punishment. More 
generally, corporate-criminal punishment provides a meaningful opportunity 
to unpack the competing influences of seemingly incompatible regulatory and 
conceptual frameworks regarding corporations.
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